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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of the credit default swaps changes of 34 European 
banks between January 2004 and December 2013. The sample period is further divided into 
four sub-periods covering both calm and turbulent times (pre-crisis, acute phase and less 
acute phase of the financial crisis, and the most recent European sovereign debt crisis). We 
show that CDS spread changes are not entirely driven by credit risk. Our main finding is that 
liquidity, and market and sector specific factors are embedded in the CDS spreads. Moreover, 
the influence of these determinants appears to be time-varying. We prove that the credit risk 
specific to the banking sector as well as the CDS liquidity manifest an influence on the 
changes in the CDS spread in all the sub-samples. Nonetheless, the market volatility changes 
do not seem to play any role, whereas equity liquidity has explanatory power only prior to the 
financial crisis. Moreover, we include an alternative channel for explaining CDS spread 
changes by means of which we control for time-specificity instead of including the market 
and sector specific variables. This analysis reveals that changes in accounting leverage do not 
explain CDS spreads fluctuations. 
 
Keywords: Credit Default Swaps, Credit Risk, European Banks, Structural Models of Credit 
Risk, Credit Ratings, Liquidity, Market Factors 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1.    Background 
 
Credit institutions had a prominent role in the financial crisis with the financial sector 
experiencing one of the biggest shocks during this period (Coro et al., 2013). As a 
consequence of this event, the timely and accurate assessment of credit risk in large banks has 
become important in order to bypass severe sectors’ disruptions (Belke and Gokus, 2011). 
Since financial institutions are often considered opaque entities that impede the credit risk 
assessment from their annual reports only (Dullmann and Sosinska, 2007), the information 
derived from the credit derivatives markets can be additionally employed in assessing the 
credit risk of banks. This market information can contribute to the timely evaluation of the 
financial stability in the banking industry.  
A common type of credit derivative is the credit default swap (CDS) which is a 
contingent claim generally used as an insurance against the default of a reference entity, thus 
allowing the transfer of credit risk between two parties: the protection buyer and seller 
(Ericsson et al., 2009). A major aspect of CDS is that they enable financial institutions to 
manage credit risk more effectively “by synthetically creating or eliminating credit risk 
exposures” (Naifar and Abid, 2005: 2). Credit default swaps are being perceived as one of the 
most meaningful developments of the past decade (Shim and Zhu, 2013) as they “turned out 
to clearly dominate other types of credit derivatives such as credit linked notes or total return 
swaps” (Norden and Weber, 2009: 530). These instruments have evolved rapidly, displaying 
an exponential growth until the beginning of the financial crisis and a significant decline 
afterwards. The Bank of International Settlements (2013) reports that the CDS notional 
amount outstanding peaked USD 58 trillion in 2007, and then decreased to USD 24 trillion in 
2013. Given the significant development in the CDS market as well as the broader range of 
maturities, the CDS achieved “a prominent role as market based credit indicator”        
(Annaert et. al, 2013: 445).  
One of the important characteristics of credit default swaps is the credit premium, also 
referred to as the CDS spread or, more broadly, the credit spread. Understanding the 
particular factors that drive the variation in financial institutions’ CDS spreads has important 
implications for market participants. Practitioners and academic researchers should adjust 
their market expectations depending on whether the changes in banks’ CDS premium are 
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related to the default or non-default elements. More specifically, if the market participants fail 
to account for the non-default element of the CDS spread, this “will have an unfortunate 
consequence of overstating the default premium” (Lin et al., 2009: 3). Furthermore, the 
information contained in the banks’ credit spreads is particularly relevant to the bank 
supervisors who use it for financial stability monitoring and monetary policy. According to 
Annaert et al. (2013), single-name CDS spreads are now a part of the financial regulators’ 
agenda. 
Prior to the financial crisis, the CDS spreads were considered a pure measure of credit 
risk (Longstaff et al., 2005). However, this belief is brought under scrutiny because of the 
significant increase of the CDS spreads during the financial turmoil. Moreover, the widening 
of the CDS spreads persists in the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis due to the loss 
of confidence in the debt markets (Calice et al., 2013). Even though some try to justify the 
rise in CDS spreads by the aggravation of credit risk, the deterioration in credit markets’ 
liquidity spawns new insights. In this respect, Bao et al. (2011) argue that it is uncertain 
which driver - liquidity or credit risk - causes the increase in the corporate bond spreads. 
Furthermore, Pu (2009) links the corporate bond and CDS markets by finding a common 
liquidity factor between the two. Therefore, the CDS spread may also incorporate a liquidity 
premium on top of the credit risk premium, which restrains the value of CDS spreads as credit 
risk indicators.  
Additionally, the financial turmoil has also exacerbated the decrease in liquidity of 
asset prices (Coro et al., 2013). This suggests that the CDS market can be affected by the 
illiquidity of other markets. Since, according to Das and Hanouna (2008), the equity and CDS 
markets are interconnected via hedging activities, the decrease or increase of liquidity in the 
equity market might have an impact on banks’ CDS spreads.  
Furthermore, the CDS spread may be influenced by additional market-wide factors. 
This is documented by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) who find the existence of a common 
component in the residuals of the regression on credit spreads after taking into account    
firm-specific variables. Moreover, according to Dullmann and Sosinska (2007), financial 
institutions’ CDS spreads are exposed to systematic risk factor, thus, showing the importance 
of taking into consideration market factors while examining the information content of 
financial institutions’ CDS.  
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Research work is inconclusive when it comes to capturing the actual determinants of 
credit spread changes. This is even more pronounced in the financial sector, for banks in 
particular. The scarcity of studies in this area is related to the specific features of the financial 
institutions, such as asset opacity, regulatory requirements, capital structure, the possibility to 
borrow from the lender of last resort and the high exposure to systematic risk. These 
characteristics make traditional credit risk models less applicable. We address this problem by 
decomposing the CDS spread while taking into consideration a wide range of variables on top 
of those originally derived from the Merton (1974) model. Moreover, it is important to further 
investigate the liquidity impact on banks’ CDS spreads and assess its dynamics throughout 
different periods. For instance, the monitoring of financial institutions should be enhanced if 
the CDS spread increase is driven by credit risk, but not if it is influenced by liquidity 
changes in the equity or CDS markets. Furthermore, banks are exposed not only to         
entity-specific credit risk, but also are highly affected by systematic risk, thus it is relevant to 
address both sources of risk in more detail.  
Our study aims to extensively investigate the determinants of credit default swap 
spread changes for a sample of financial institutions. In order to achieve this, we use a panel 
data model in which the dependent variable is given by the CDS spread changes. CDS spread 
changes are investigated pre-crisis, during the financial crisis (acute and less acute phase), 
and the European sovereign debt crisis as well as throughout the whole period in order to take 
into consideration their large fluctuations. Our starting point is based on the theoretical 
determinants of default risk, such as leverage, volatility and the risk-free rate. We further 
extend our analysis by incorporating CDS and equity market liquidity, business cycle and 
business climate proxies, general state of economy and sector specific drivers. We employ 
two different approaches in exploring the information content of CDS spread changes. Firstly, 
we run pooled models containing the examined determinants. In the second approach, we aim 
to account for the role of market factors in explaining the CDS spread changes by controlling 
for time-specificity using two panel data estimators, namely fixed effects and random effects 
models. 
 
1.2.    Purpose 
 
The main objective of our study is to determine the drivers of European banks’ CDS 
spread changes. Broadly speaking, the main reason we research the information content in the 
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banks’ CDS spread changes is that it has implication for the financial stability of the 
European banking industry.  
Our study aims to extend the related body of empirical works on credit default swaps 
in a number of ways. Some of the previous studies exclude banks altogether because of their 
specificity and asset opacity. Other papers use the same framework to account for the CDS 
determinants of both financial and non-financial entities. Therefore, our study is one of the 
very few concerned with analysing the CDS of banks. Since the bulk of empirical literature 
mainly concentrates on U.S. banks, we aim to further enhance it by tackling European banks 
in particular. Moreover, we contribute to the existing literature by investigating four time 
periods, respectively before and throughout the financial crisis as well as during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the composition 
of the CDS spreads of banks post the financial crisis.  
In addition, our analysis deepens the knowledge into the credit risk and liquidity 
components of banks’ CDS premium. On top of the market proxy for leverage, we include a 
balance sheet metric capturing leverage which as far as we are concerned is insufficiently 
addressed in the previous studies on the drivers of financial institutions’ CDS spreads. Only 
the research of Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) utilizes one balance sheet ratio as a proxy for 
leverage while analysing banks’ CDS spreads. Moreover, our paper incorporates credit 
ratings downgrades and upgrades as explanatory variables of the CDS spread changes. To our 
knowledge, this approach has not been directly implemented on the CDS spreads of banks. 
Lastly, we assess the importance of both the CDS liquidity and the equity liquidity of 
financial institutions’ CDS spreads, thus further complementing the existing studies. 
 
1.3.    Scope and Delimitations 
 
 We limit our study by taking into consideration only listed European banks. The final 
sample is highly influenced by the availability of data on CDS quotes. Our research covers 
the period January 2004 to December 2013. We do not take into account the first quarter of 
2014 as in our analysis we also incorporate accounting data that is not available at the start of 
the study.  
 In this paper, we employ the alternative structural approach and not the direct reduced 
form or structural form credit risk models. In this approach, we utilize the possible drivers of 
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the credit spreads as explanatory variables in the regressions instead of treating them as inputs 
in the credit risk models. We are interested in explaining banks’ CDS spreads rather than 
predicting CDS spreads for the next period, therefore we limit our research to examining only 
contemporaneous variables. Due to the lack of data on the components of liquidity measures 
in the bond market, we do not address bonds illiquidity impact on CDS spreads.  
 
1.4.    Outline 
 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents in detail the CDS 
contracts and their mechanics as well as the benefits of CDS spreads as credit spreads. This is 
followed by a description of credit risk models, with a particular emphasis on the Merton 
model (1974) that serves as a basis for our choice of theoretical determinants of the CDS 
spreads. The section ends with the review on the literature in the credit risk area. In Section 3, 
we consider the methodology underpinning our research, including the choice of data, 
variables, descriptive statistics and models specifications. The following section presents the 
empirical results of our analysis. We conclude our study in Section 5.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1.    Credit Default Swaps 
 
Invented in the mid-1990s, credit derivatives are over-the-counter instruments that 
allow credit risk transfer from one party to another (Shim and Zhu, 2013). Generally 
speaking, credit default swaps can be seen as insurance contracts against the default of an 
underlying entity, in which the seller of protection pays compensation if a credit event occurs, 
while in return the buyer of protection makes regular payments based on the credit default 
swap premium, often referred to as the spread (Ericsson et al., 2009). CDS can be classified 
into three types: single-name CDS, CDS indices and basket CDS (ECB, 2009). The European 
Central Bank (2009: 9) defines a single-name CDS as a contract that “offers protection for a 
single corporate or sovereign reference entity”. Blanco et al. (2005) further describe       
single-name CDS as the credit derivatives exhibiting the highest liquidity and forming the 
basis for building more complicated credit products.  
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The other type of CDS is CDS indices which can be characterized as an insurance 
against “default risk on the pool of names in the index” (Amato and Gyntelberg, 2005: 74). 
CDS indices have the specific feature that in a credit event, which can be triggered by 
bankruptcy, restructuring or a failure to pay, the CDS contract is not terminated      
(Alexander and Kaeck, 2008).  
The last type of CDS is the basket CDS. Hull and White (2000) define the basket CDS 
as an instrument involving multiple reference entities and providing a payoff once the first of 
these entities defaults. ECB (2009) gives a classification of the specific types within the 
basket CDS, which includes: first-to-default CDS, untranched basket, synthetic CDO and full 
basket CDS. 
The use of credit default swaps both for hedging and trading purposes contributes to 
enlarging the view of market participants regarding the information on the financial health of 
the reference entity. Hedging with CDS isolates the credit risk from interest rate and currency 
risks by allowing an entity to hedge its credit exposure without selling the loan or bond 
(Naifar and Abid, 2005). Additionally, trading CDS enables the shift of risk from those with 
highly concentrated positions to those who want additional exposure. 
Other benefits of CDS are visible in the bond market. In this respect, hedge funds 
managers can take advantage of the pricing differences between the CDS and the bond 
market without having a direct exposure to the reference entity. Moreover, borrowers can 
gain from the trading of CDS which presumably reduces the cost of bond issuance and 
increases the liquidity of bond portfolio. Finally, the CDS protection seller can “take exposure 
to the desirable credit in the exact maturity of its choice” (Naifar and Abid, 2005: 3).  
The financial turmoil disclosed several imperfections of the CDS market, such as the 
shortfall of transparency in connection with CDS opening positions and a lack of counterparty 
credit risk management (Gupta, 2012). In response to these shortcomings, the Basel 
Committee adjusted the beneficial treatment for structured credit positions with respect to the 
capital requirements (ECB, 2009) indicating that regulators are concerned with the risk in the 
credit derivatives market. Nevertheless, the ECB (2009) recognizes the overall contribution of 
the CDS to the market completeness and the fact that these derivatives enable the pricing of 
risk as some underlying assets exhibit liquidity scarcity. 
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2.2.    CDS Spreads as Credit Spreads 
 
The credit spread, which captures the credit risk of an entity can be represented by the 
CDS spread or bond yield spread. The CDS spread is “the cost per annum for protection 
against the default by the company” (Hull et al., 2004: 2), while the corporate bond spread is 
given by the corporate bond yield minus the corresponding risk-free rate (Chen et al., 2007). 
Hull et al. (2004) show that given certain assumptions these two credit spreads are firmly 
connected. However, the swap spread is often preferred to the bond spread due to a number of 
advantages. Ericsson et al. (2009) argue that CDS spreads are straightforwardly captured and 
thus are not associated with the choice of a riskless benchmark. The benefits of not having to 
select a reference risk-free asset and to eliminate coupon effects are further emphasized by 
Houweling and Vorst (2005). Moreover, Delatte et al. (2012) verify that the CDS market 
holds a dominant position with regard to the information transmission in the bond and CDS 
markets. Furthermore, one recent study by Coudert et al. (2013) finds that the CDS of 
financial institutions contribute more to the price discovery process than bonds.  
Another advantage of default swap spreads is that they are said to capture fluctuations 
in credit risk more accurately and quickly than bond yield spreads (Zhu, 2006). One 
explanation is that the market and additional factors affect the credit premium of bonds to a 
great extent. Indeed, corporate bond spreads are highly impacted by other determinants, such 
as liquidity and tax rates. Previous research reveals the time-varying dynamics of the liquidity 
component. In this respect, Nielsen et al. (2012) observe that at least a part of the credit 
spread widening at the onset of the financial crisis can be attributable to a decrease in bond 
liquidity. Furthermore, Longstaff et al. (2005) address the tax impact on the bond yield 
spread.  
  
2.3.    Credit Risk Models 
 
Studies that address the pricing of credit risk reveal a dichotomy between reduced 
form and structural form models. Reduced form models “treat default as an unpredictable 
event governed by a hazard rate process” (Naifar and Abid, 2005: 4), while the structural 
models assume that default is triggered when the value of a firm’s assets falls below a 
particular threshold, expressed as a function of the amount of debt outstanding             
(Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). According to Naifar and Abid (2005: 4), even though there are 
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considerable differences between these two types of models, they both are “rooted in the no 
arbitrage analysis of Black-Scholes-Merton (1974)”. Following Black-Scholes-Merton (1974) 
findings, structural models use firm specific variables to model the default process, while the 
reduced form models remain silent on the theoretical framework for the drivers of the prices 
of defaultable securities (Ericsson et al., 2009). Structural models have the advantage of 
offering an economic context underlying the event of default. 
The Merton model often constitutes a point of departure in the discussion on structural 
credit risk models. Merton (1974) develops his model for pricing corporate debt in 
accordance with the Black–Scholes (1973) option valuation method, as this framework relies 
on observable variables that enable empirical testing.  
Lyden and Saraniti (2000) describe Merton’s framework as a closed form solution for 
valuing a zero-coupon corporate bond by modelling the firm’s equity as a call option on the 
firm’s asset value, assumed to follow the lognormal process implied by the Black-Scholes 
model. The firm is considered to default if the asset value drops below a particular threshold, 
given by the face value of debt (Blanco et al., 2005). 
The Merton model is utilized to derive the expressions for the probability of default 
(Hull et al., 2004). In order to achieve this, Bharath and Shumway (2008:1344) document that 
Merton relies on the following two equations.  
The first is the Black-Scholes-Merton equation that expresses the equity value as a 
function of the firm value: 
E = V*N (    -  
   *F*N (   ,                                             (1) 
 
   
  (
 
 
) (        
 )  
   √ 
,  
 
  =    -    √ ,  
where E is the market value of the firm’s equity, V is the total value of the firm, N(.) is the 
cumulative standard normal distribution function, r is the instantaneous risk-free rate,  and    
F is the face value of the firm’s debt. 
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The second equation is concerned with the volatility of the firm’s equity and is based 
on Ito’s lemma: 
                                                         = (
 
 
)  
  
  
   ,                                                             (2) 
where    is the volatility of equity and    is the volatility of the firm’s assets.  
These two non-linear equations enable the derivation of the value of the firm’s assets 
and the firm’s volatility, which are otherwise not directly observable. These inputs are used to 
calculate the distance to default as: 
                                                    DD = 
  (
 
 
) (        
 )  
   √ 
,                                                 (3) 
where   is the expected return on the firm’s assets. 
Finally, the resulting distance to default is substituted into a cumulative density 
function in order to calculate the default probability i.e. that the firm value will be less than 
the face value of debt at the forecasting horizon (Bharath and Shumway, 2008):  
                               = N ((   
  (
 
 
) (        
 )  
   √ 
 ))= N (-DD)                         (4) 
Ericsson et al. (2009) posit that the main drawback of structural models is given by 
the practical difficulties in their implementation. This fact presumably leads to the 
employment of the alternative structural approach in the studies of credit risk. Starting with 
the notable research of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), this alternative structural approach is 
utilized in finding the theoretical drivers of the credit spreads. These determinants are “used 
as explanatory variables in regressions for changes in corporate credit spreads, rather than 
inputs to a particular structural model” (Ericsson et al., 2009: 110). Following the          
Black-Scholes-Merton (1974) findings, the drivers of default are investigated to be entity 
leverage, asset volatility and the risk-free rate. Higher leverage and asset volatility lead to a 
higher probability of default and higher credit spread. The increase in the risk-free rate lowers 
probability of default, and consistently reduces the credit spread. In our study, we aim to 
make use of this structural approach. 
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2.4.    Literature Review 
 
This section is organised according to the evolution of research in the credit risk area. 
We first emphasize the research on the determinants of credit spreads, then we address the 
literature that discusses CDS in more detail, and finally we concentrate on the studies that 
cover financial institutions’ CDS.  
The strand of literature on credit risk is influenced by the notable study of          
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). This study examines the effect of factors implied by default 
risk models on the changes of the credit spread measured as the individual bond yield spread. 
They find relatively low explanatory power of the examined determinants and hence 
emphasize the deficiency of structural models, such as the Merton (1974) model. However, 
after employing a principal component approach on the residuals, Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001) prove that the residuals are highly cross-correlated and underline the existence of 
some common systematic factor in credit risk. Later research works (Das et al., 2006; 
Dullmann and Sosinska, 2007; Tang and Yan, 2008; Annaert et al., 2013; and                   
Core et al., 2013) support these findings by incorporating market-wide variables when 
examining the determinants of the credit spread.  
The substantial development of the credit derivatives market led the literature on 
credit risk to focus more on CDS. Nonetheless, throughout the past years a limited amount of 
studies (Hull et al., 2004; Naifar and Abid, 2005; Das et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2007;         
Tang and Yan, 2008; Ericsson et al., 2009; Das and Hanouna, 2008; and Core et al., 2013) are 
devoted to the CDS. Some of these papers concentrate on non-financial institutions, whereas 
others combine financial and non-financial entities.  
Hull et al. (2004) question the CDS and bond spreads anticipation of credit ratings 
announcements. Their study proves that the CDS market foresees the rating events and finds 
that positive credit announcements are less influential than negative ones. Similarly,      
Naifar and Abid (2005) investigate ratings on top of other sources of influence on CDS such 
as maturity, equity volatility, risk free rate and the slope of the yield curve. Their study 
uncovers that almost all the employed variables are statistically significant and highlights that 
the credit rating is the most relevant determinant of the CDS spreads. Relative to this paper, 
our study analyses downgrades’ and upgrades’ effect on the CDS spread changes, and 
distinguishes itself by taking into consideration the pre-crisis as well as the financial crisis, 
and the European sovereign debt crisis period. 
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More recently, Ericsson et al. (2009) examine the relationship between the CDS 
spreads and the traditional determinants of default risk, such as companies’ leverage, 
volatility and risk-free rate. They observe that volatility and leverage are statistically 
significant in both univariate and multivariate regressions, thus proving the importance of the 
explanatory variables originally derived from the Merton (1974) model. Our analysis further 
complements this study by incorporating sector specific, market factors and proxies for 
general economic conditions in addition to the variables derived from the Merton (1974) 
model.  
In the empirical research of Das et al. (2006), cross-sectional regularities in CDS 
prices are analysed rather than their time-series dynamics. They undertake a comparison of 
models that are correspondingly based on either entity accounting data or market-wide 
variables. One of the main conclusions of the study is that the hybrid model containing both 
market and accounting variables exhibits the best fit. Following this paper, we incorporate a 
balance sheet ratio of leverage when analysing the CDS spread changes.  
The study of Chen et al. (2007) addresses the drivers of CDS spreads with an 
increased interest into the liquidity element. One of the main findings in this research is that, 
opposite to the bond market in which there is a negative relation between liquidity and the 
bond spread, the more liquid credit default swaps should have a broader spread. The liquidity 
of CDS is further examined by Tang and Yan (2008) and Coro et al. (2013). Tang and Yan 
(2008) observe that liquidity is priced in the CDS market, while Coro et al. (2013) ascertain 
the dominant role of liquidity in comparison with entity-specific credit risk drivers.  
Another study that covers the issue of liquidity is that of Das and Hanouna (2008). 
This research assesses the impact of the equity market illiquidity on the CDS spread. They 
assert that the equity and CDS markets are connected via hedging activities and find that the 
equity liquidity of the reference entity has a negative relation with the CDS spread.  
 However, according to Raunig and Scheicher (2009), most of the empirical studies on 
CDS spreads do not differentiate between the financial and non-financial entities or just 
eliminate banks from their samples, thus leaving only several studies concentrating in more 
detail on the financial sector. Some notable examples, which include Dullmann and Sosinska 
(2007), Calice et al. (2012), Raunig and Scheicher (2009), Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) and 
Annaert et al. (2013), are analysed below. 
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 One of the early research works that entirely focuses on banks is that of Dullmann and 
Sosinska (2007). This study analyses the CDS spreads and investigates their usefulness as 
market indicators by assessing the explanatory power of liquidity, idiosyncratic credit risk 
and systematic credit risk factors. Their research concludes that liquidity and market factors 
are important determinants of banks’ CDS, whereas the idiosyncratic credit risk proxy varies 
in significance for different samples.  
 The study of Raunig and Scheicher (2009) explores the differences in market pricing 
of credit risk between the financial and non-financial sectors. They emphasize the financial 
markets’ discrimination between the CDS of the major US and European banks and          
non-financial companies. One of their main findings is that the risk premium demanded by 
investors for taking the risk exposure is time-varying and this effect is stronger for             
non-financial companies.  
 Another research work undertaken on banks is that of Calice et al. (2012), where the 
focus is on influence of the market for CDS indices on the world’s banking industry. They 
examine the relationship between the banks’ stock returns and CDS indices. Their results 
posit a negative relation between the two and additionally uncover that the CDS market 
volatility affects the volatility of financial institutions’ equity returns.  
Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) further expand the research on financial institutions by 
making use of accounting data to investigate the viability of CDS spreads as a proxy for bank 
risk. More specifically, they study the relationship between bank balance sheet ratios and 
bank CDS spreads. Their analysis proves that the CDS spread drivers fluctuate over time 
depending on the existing state of the economy. The overall result is that the risk revealed by 
balance sheet ratios is reflected in banks CDS spreads, especially during the financial crisis.  
 Finally, to our knowledge, there is only one study by Annaert et al. (2013) that 
explicitly takes into account the CDS spreads of the financial institutions and examines their 
decomposition. The main determinants of CDS spreads are categorized into credit risk, 
marketability and market wide factors. The CDS liquidity components as well as the market 
and business cycle variables are found to have explanatory power on the CDS spreads in 
addition to the Merton inspired variables. We complement this research by taking into 
consideration the most recent European sovereign debt crisis period and utilizing a larger 
sample of banks. In addition, we consider a wider range of CDS spread changes determinants, 
among which the interest rate swap, accounting leverage, credit ratings, and equity liquidity. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1.    Data 
 
In this paper, we use a sample comprising of monthly data on the CDS quotes of 34 
listed European banks (Appendix A). Firstly, we restrict our sample by including the 
European banks that have CDS data available. Moreover, we exclude banks that are acquired 
during the sample period. We further limit our sample by including only listed entities. Our 
final sample incorporates banks from Austria (2), Belgium (1), Denmark (1), France (4), 
Germany (1), Greece (4), Ireland (1), Italy (6), Portugal (3), Spain (5), Sweden (4), and The 
United Kingdom (2).  
The CDS quotes include the bid, ask and mid prices that we use for the bid-ask 
spreads and the CDS spreads. The Credit Market Analysis (CMA) ended their agreement with 
Thomson Reuters Datastream in 2010, hence imposing limitations on the availability of CDS 
quotes after this date in Datastream. Therefore, we resort to the S&P Capital IQ platform in 
order to retrieve the CDS quotes. We choose senior unsecured CDS contracts with a maturity 
of 5 years as they are the most frequently traded. Data on credit ratings is obtained from 
Moody’s due to the historical data availability. Equity and benchmark government bond 
yields are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream, whereas accounting data is taken 
from S&P Capital IQ. 
The sample data covers the period starting from January 2004 to December 2013. The 
starting date is chosen as January 2004 as a very limited amount of CDS quotes is available 
before this date. December 2013 is taken as a closing date in order to complement the existing 
literature on credit default swaps by including the most recent data. The selected end date is 
compatible with the accounting data availability.  
The choice of a monthly CDS frequency is twofold. First, Tang and Yan (2008) report 
sparsity in the daily CDS transactions. Second, the highest frequency at which the accounting 
data is available is on quarterly basis. Following the method of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), 
we use linear interpolation to obtain monthly estimates of the quarterly accounting data. 
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3.2.    Dependent Variable 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the median of the CDS spread in levels experienced a rapid 
increase since the start of the financial crisis, whereas an even higher rise occurred during the 
European sovereign debt crisis (further referred to as the Eurozone crisis). In addition, the 
fluctuation in the median of the CDS spread is visible since the mid of 2007 and it becomes 
particularly pronounced since 2011. This proves the importance of examining the differential 
impact of the chosen explanatory variables on the CDS spreads over sub-periods as well as 
the full period.  
   
 
Figure 1. Median of CDS spreads 
The figure displays the sample median of the CDS spread. The first dotted vertical line corresponds to the 
start of the financial crisis (July 2007). The second line depicts the employed beginning of the European 
sovereign debt crisis (April 2010). 
 
The analysed period is further divided into four sub-periods: pre-crisis, acute phase 
and less acute phase of the financial crisis, and the post financial crisis period which covers 
the Eurozone crisis. According to Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), and Chiaramonte and 
Casu (2013), the financial crisis began in July 2007. Figure 1 depicts the sudden changes in 
the CDS since July 2007, confirming the choice of the pre-crisis period to be                 
January 2004 - June 2007. Consistently with Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), in our analysis, 
the financial crisis encompasses two phases: an acute phase (July 2007 – March 2009) and a 
less acute phase (July 2007 – March 2010). Even though Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) 
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state that the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis is November 2009, according to 
Lane (2012), the bond market experienced the first signs of this crisis only in 2010 with the 
widening of the Greek 10-year government bond redemption yields. As CDS and bond 
markets are interconnected, the beginning of the Eurozone crisis is chosen to be April 2010. 
This is supported by the considerable increase in the median of the CDS spread since this date 
(Figure 1). Therefore, the last sub-period covers April 2010 – December 2013.  
Moreover, it can be observed that the CDS spread series may not be stationary. Thus, 
we test the CDS spread for non-stationary. Non-stationary series have a time-varying mean or 
time-varying variance or both and can lead to spurious regressions (Gujarati, 2004). In order 
to tackle this issue, we employ a univariate unit root test for the CDS spreads of each      
cross-sectional entity for the whole sample period.  In this respect, the Augmented       
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test uncovers that the banks’ CDS spreads are non-stationary, with the 
exception of Erste Group Bank (see Appendix B). This finding justifies taking first 
differences of the CDS spread since this adjustment induces stationarity according to the ADF 
test on first differences (not reported). Therefore, our study examines the changes in the CDS 
spreads instead of the CDS levels. 
 
3.3.   Explanatory Variables 
 
The explanatory variables are classified into six groups of determinants, respectively 
structural model based, ratings upgrades and downgrades, CDS liquidity, equity liquidity, 
market-wide and sector specific. The further description of each group and the corresponding 
variables is provided in the subsequent sections. 
 
3.3.1. Structural Model Based Variables 
 
Structural models use firm specific variables to model the default process. The 
variables encompassing credit risk are chosen in accordance with the Merton (1974) model 
framework which is based on the following drivers of default: financial leverage, asset 
volatility and the risk free rate.  
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3.3.1.1.  Financial Leverage 
 
Financial ratios are exposed to accounting standards and practices that may to some 
extent affect the information contained in them regarding the prospects of banks. However, 
Das et al. (2006) contend that accounting data incorporates additional information on credit 
risk that is not fully captured by market based models. Therefore, we include a balance sheet 
proxy for leverage. To our knowledge, the use of a balance sheet proxy for leverage in the 
structural model approach framework while investigating financial institutions has not been 
exploited before and deserves to be analysed. Only the study of Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) 
employs accounting variables when examining the CDS spreads of banks. However, their 
study is entirely focused on balance sheet ratios. Consistently with the research of 
Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), leverage is defined as Total Equity/Total Assets and it is 
expected that an increase in this ratio should lead to a lower CDS spread change. The reason 
for this is that holding total assets constant and diminishing equity should correspond to an 
increased Debt/Total Assets ratio, and thus to a higher probability of default.  
Following the studies of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Blanco et al. (2005), and 
Avramov et al. (2007), for robustness we use bank stock returns as a second proxy for 
leverage. This choice is motivated by the difficulty to arrive at a reliable market value of 
leverage. Moreover, stock returns are expected to have the opposite effect on the CDS 
spreads since negative stock returns is related to an increase in leverage, and thus should lead 
to a higher credit spread. The studies of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Avramov et al. 
(2007) confirm the negative relation between stock returns and changes in credit spreads.  
 
3.3.1.2.  Equity Volatility 
 
As underlined in the Merton model section, another theoretical determinant of the 
CDS spread is the firm value volatility. Since this variable is unobservable, it can be proxied 
by a measure of equity volatility. This follows from Ito’s lemma (equation 2), which posits a 
positive relationship between the two. In theory, we expect an increase in equity volatility to 
lead to an increase in firm’s value volatility, which in turn will raise the probability of the 
firm value hitting the default barrier. This will translate into a positive effect on the CDS 
spread changes. Naifar and Abid (2005) find that the relationship between CDS spreads in 
levels and equity volatility is positive, whereas Ericsson et al. (2005) confirm the existence of 
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the positive link when analysing the changes of CDS spreads. However, the study of    
Annaert et al. (2013) reveals inconsistent results and in some cases an intuitively implausible 
negative relation between banks’ CDS spread changes and equity volatility. Following 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008), we use a statistical volatility measure calculated from the 
historical stock return data.  
 
3.3.1.3.  Risk-free Interest Rate 
 
The introduction of the risk-free rate as a determinant of the CDS spread is rooted in 
the Merton model, in which the risk-free rate constitutes the risk-adjusted drift of the firm 
value (Ericsson et al., 2009). The risk free interest rate is expected to be inversely related to 
the CDS spread. This stems from the fact that the static effect of a higher interest rate is to 
increase the risk-neutral drift of the firm’s assets, which in turn reduces the probability of 
default leading to a lower credit spread (Blanco et al., 2005). The dependency between        
risk-free interest rates and credit spread changes is empirically covered in the study of  
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), which presents the latter as a decreasing function of the former. 
Thus, a negative relationship is expected between changes in CDS spreads and interest rates. 
Nevertheless, Raunig and Scheicher (2009) investigate that the sign of the risk-free rate 
coefficient estimate is not consistent as it does not take a negative value on all occasions. 
We use two proxies for the risk-free rate. The yields on government bonds are the 
most common metric, thus, we first use monthly observations on the benchmark 10-year 
government bond yields provided by the European Central Bank (ECB).  
Moreover, the unobservable risk-free rate can also be measured by the interest rate 
swaps instead of government bond yields. Blanco et al. (2005: 2261) assert that government 
bond yields are affected by “taxation treatment, repo specials, scarcity premium, and 
benchmark status”. The interest rate swaps constitute a better alternative since they are liquid 
and quoted on a constant maturity basis. Our second proxy of the risk-free rate is given by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 5-year euro interest rate swap. 
  
3.3.2. Ratings 
 
Daniels and Jensen (2005) describe credit ratings as the paramount source of 
information on credit risk. Moreover, Micu et al. (2004) emphasize one of the main benefits 
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of credit ratings, namely the standardization of risk categories that enables the comparison 
between the entities.  
Since the CDS market is said to anticipate the credit rating announcements             
(Hull et al., 2004), it can be used as an alternative to the bond market. Furthermore, research 
by Naifar and Abid (2005) uncovers that the credit rating is a prominent determinant of credit 
default swaps, which is consistent with the relationship between ratings and default 
probabilities. 
To our knowledge, the assessment of the explanatory power of credit ratings upgrades 
and downgrades on banks’ CDS spread changes is not sufficiently addressed. Only the study 
of Annaert et al. (2013) takes into consideration financial institutions’ credit ratings, however 
instead of employing credit rating change as an independent variable, Annaert et al. (2013) 
divide the sample based on ratings. 
The credit market is led by three rating agencies: Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor’s (Tichy, 2011). Credit ratings by Moody’s are employed in our study due to the 
availability of historical data on credit ratings on Moody’s website. Moody’s credit ratings 
comprise of a scale from Aaa to C. This can be divided into investment grade ratings ranging 
from Aaa to Baa3, and below investment grade ratings situated between Ba1 and C        
(Tichy, 2011).  
In order to account for the upgrade and downgrade of the entity’s rating, two dummy 
explanatory variables are constructed. A dummy variable essentially is a vector containing 
values of 0 and 1. The downgrade variable takes the following values: 
     {
                        
                                   
 
 If the entity is downgraded, then the first dummy variable takes the value of 1 and 
otherwise it obtains a value of 0.  Similarly, an upgrade dummy variable is defined as: 
     {
                         
                                   
 
If an upgrade occurs, then this variable gets a value of 1 and in all other cases the 
dummy is designated a value of 0.  
Intuitively, the credit spread is negatively related to the credit rating: the lower the 
credit rating, the higher is the credit spread (Hull et al., 2004). This is further confirmed in the 
study of Naifar and Abid (2005), where it is observed that CDS spreads of entities with better 
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credit ratings are lower. All in all, a negative link can be anticipated: the upgrade should lead 
to the lower CDS spread change, whereas the opposite is expected for the downgrade. 
 
3.3.3. CDS Liquidity 
 
Hicks (1962) describes liquidity as the possibility to promptly undertake a transaction. 
Even though the term liquidity first arose in studies on the equity market, an interest with 
regard to liquidity is also manifested in bond and credit derivatives markets. Some research 
works (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2007; Bao et al., 2011; Nielsen et al., 2012) 
express an increased attention to the possibility of illiquidity of corporate bonds being a factor 
in the credit spread puzzle, whereas a limited amount of studies focus on the liquidity of 
CDS. Pu (2009) adopts market depth, associated with the number of CDS quotes contributors, 
and the proportion of zero daily spread changes as measures of credit market liquidity, 
whereas Chen et al. (2010) propose the use of the CDS bid-ask spread as a liquidity proxy. In 
a study by Tang and Yan (2008), it is suggested to employ liquidity measures such as the 
number of contracts outstanding, spread volatility to the number of quotes, bid-ask spread and 
the ratio of quotes to trades. 
Overall, in order to capture the liquidity element in CDS spreads, we choose to use the 
CDS bid-ask spread as a proxy of liquidity. The selection of this particular explanatory 
variable is in line with other studies. Dullmann and Sosinska (2007) prove that the CDS      
bid-ask spread is a significant explanatory variable of the CDS premium, whereas Tang and 
Yan (2008) show that the bid-ask spread is highly correlated with several other liquidity 
measures. Thus, they show the reliability of the CDS bid-ask spread as a liquidity measure. 
Consistently with Chen et al. (2007), we calculate the CDS bid-ask spread as the difference 
between the bid and ask prices divided by the bid-ask midpoint. 
Intuitively, we expect a negative relationship between liquidity and the CDS spread. 
Therefore, a higher CDS bid-ask spread change should indicate a decrease in liquidity and 
imply a higher CDS spread change. However, the study of Chen et al. (2007) further confirms 
the positive relationship between liquidity and the CDS spread.  
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3.3.4. Equity Liquidity 
 
The liquidity component is an attested determinant of credit spreads, with a number of 
studies documenting the relationship between bond market liquidity and bond yield spreads 
(Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Ericsson and Renault, 2006), and respectively between CDS 
market liquidity and swap spreads (Dullmann and Sosinska, 2007; Tang and Yan, 2007). On 
top of these findings, Das and Hanouna (2009) establish the existence of a relationship 
between the CDS spreads and equity market liquidity via hedging activities. Their reasoning 
is based on the fact that equity markets are used by CDS sellers to hedge their credit risk 
exposures. As such, a decrease in equity market liquidity will make hedging more expensive, 
thus raising the CDS spreads in order to compensate for the higher costs                             
(Das and Hanuona, 2009). The effect of equity market liquidity on the CDS spread is further 
explored in the studies of Tang and Yan (2006), and Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012). The 
former paper finds a positive relationship between stock illiquidity and CDS spreads, while 
the latter study analyses the impact of the change in the Amihud illiquidity measure for a 
stock portfolio of iTraxx index constituents on the iTraxx spread change. Breitenfellner and 
Wagner (2012) also uncover a significant positive relationship between the stock market 
illiquidity and CDS spreads. 
Amihud (2002: 32) argues that the bid-ask spread is a “finer and better” measure of 
liquidity, therefore we use it as a proxy for equity liquidity. Following Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), we construct the bid-ask spread of the reference entities (banks) as the 
difference between the bid and ask prices divided by the average of the two. We expect that 
the increase in the bid-ask spreads of banks’ stock, which constitutes higher illiquidity, should 
lead to a rise in the CDS spread.  
 
3.3.5. Market Factors  
 
Previous research reveals that credit spreads can be impacted by the business cycle in 
multiple ways. Berndt et al. (2005) observe that the time-varying tendency of the credit risk 
premium is an indicator that investors’ risk aversion also depends on the business cycle. 
Annaert et al. (2013) observe that market frictions, which can constrain the free flow of 
capital, lead to a temporary high risk premium. In the light of this evidence, we expect 
changes in business, and market conditions to affect the changes in credit spreads.  
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3.3.5.1. The Slope of the Term Structure 
 
According to Estrella and Mishkin (1997), the slope of the term structure constitutes a 
proxy for the business cycle. The increase in this explanatory variable is expected to 
negatively affect the credit spread change, since a high slope is indicative of higher economic 
growth. In a manner that is consistent with Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), we measure the 
slope of the term structure as the difference between the 10-year and 5-year yields of 
benchmark government bonds provided by the ECB. 
 
3.3.5.2. General State of the Economy 
 
Following a number of prominent studies such as Dullman and Sosinska (2007), 
Ericsson et al. (2009) and Annaert et al. (2013), we use a stock market index as an indicator 
of the overall state of the economy. We assume that a stock return index is more appropriate 
to capture the overall economic conditions than the individual stock returns that are 
influenced by the information on the prospects of each entity.  
The previous research works mostly utilize the S&P 500 index. However, our study 
concentrates on the European market, thus we employ the STOXX Europe 600 index. The 
reasoning behind this is that this particular index represents a large number of companies with 
different market capitalizations and it can be perceived as an adequate proxy for the state of 
economy.  
The findings of Dullman and Sosinska (2007), Ericsson et al. (2009) and            
Annaert et al. (2013) affirm that the relationship between the CDS spread change and return 
on the chosen stock index is negative. The observed result is intuitive since favorable 
business conditions are expected to lower the probabilities of default and increase the 
recovery rates. Subsequently, we expect to find a negative link between the return on the 
STOXX Europe 600 index and banks’ CDS spread changes. 
 
3.3.5.3. Market Wide Volatility 
 
Market wide volatility is used to capture the business climate. The positive link 
between changes in market wide volatility and credit spread, and the statistical significance of 
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the market volatility as explanatory variable is observed in the study of Coro et al. (2013). 
This finding is theoretically plausible since higher volatility leads to higher uncertainty about 
the future economic prospects and higher credit spread changes. Accordingly, we also expect 
a positive relationship between changes in credit spreads and market volatility. We aim to use 
the market wide implied volatility, which is a forward-looking estimate that refers to the 
“volatility of the return of the asset underlying an option in an option pricing model”     
(Lopez and Navarro, 2012: 11909). To achieve this, we use the VSTOXX volatility index 
calculated using the prices of options on the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 (Lopez and 
Navarro, 2012). 
 
3.3.6. Sector Specific Variable 
 
The financial crisis raised awareness about banks’ internal mechanisms, thus shifting 
attention to the financial variables that capture their intrinsic credit and funding risks, such as 
the swap spread.  
 
3.3.6.1.  Swap Spread  
 
Eichengreen et al. (2012) document that the TED spread is one of the common factors 
in banks’ credit default swaps spreads. This metric can be expressed as the difference 
between the interest rates on inter-bank loans (3-month LIBOR) and short-term government 
debt. Since the TED spread reflects liquidity or flight-to-quality risks on top of banks’ credit 
risk, it can be decomposed into two components: LIBOR-OIS and OIS-government bond, 
where OIS is the ‘overnight index swap’. The former captures the banking sector credit risk 
premium, while the latter gives the liquidity premium. In order to capture the credit and 
funding risks, we use the LIBOR-OIS differential, where the overnight index swap is given 
by the euro 3-month OIS. We expect a positive relationship between the changes on CDS 
spreads and the swap spread as intuitively higher credit risk should increase CDS spreads. 
 
3.4.   Descriptive Statistics 
 
Before proceeding with the model specification it is desirable to analyse a number of 
descriptive statistics in order to capture the distribution of the variables.  
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Table 1 reports the mean, maximum (max.), minimum (min.) and standard deviation 
(std. dev.) of the CDS spread changes during the different periods in our sample. First of all, 
the distance between the maximum and the minimum values of the CDS spread changes is 
large especially during the financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, which suggests that there 
is dispersion in the data. In addition to this, the increase in standard deviation from pre-crisis 
to crisis period as well as its heightened level during the Eurozone crisis indicates the time 
varying characteristics of the CDS spread changes. Thus, the CDS spread changes appear 
more volatile during turbulent times. Moreover, the Jarque-Bera test (not reported) rejects 
normality in all periods.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the CDS spread changes 
 
Statistic Pre-Crisis Acute Crisis Less Acute Crisis  Eurozone Crisis All  
Mean -0,25 8,94 4,30 1,40 1,78 
Max. 37,80 274,63 274,63 809,00 809,00 
Min. -27,80 -188,60 -229,70 -731,00 -731,00 
Std. Dev. 3,42 33,42 35,14 111,34 78,38 
 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of CDS 
spread changes (basis points) during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
  
The descriptive statistics of the changes of explanatory variables are presented in 
Appendix C. The highest dispersion in data measured as the difference between maximum 
and minimum values is observed in Eurozone crisis for the following variables: Total 
Equity/Total Assets ratio, stock returns, equity volatility, benchmark government bond yield 
and the slope of the term structure. This is in line with the standard deviations being highest 
in the same period. Moreover, this result shows consistency with the high volatility in CDS 
data in Eurozone crisis. However, observations on changes in both CDS and equity liquidity 
have the highest dispersion in the pre-crisis period, whereas most of the market and sector 
specific variables are investigated to be more volatile during the financial crisis. Finally, it 
can be observed that there were no credit rating upgrades during the two phases of the 
financial crisis.  
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3.5.   Model 
 
Our sample consists of a group of cross-sectional financial entities with observations 
throughout time which constitute a panel of data. Gujarati (2004: 637) indicates that a panel 
gives “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more 
degrees of freedom and more efficiency”. Furthermore, panel data can assist better in 
studying the dynamics of change as it contains a number of the repeated observations in the 
cross sectional dimension (Gujarati, 2004). Finally, panel data makes it possible to tackle a 
more complex range of issues (Brooks, 2008) by enabling the control of entity heterogeneity 
and time-specificity.  
In our study, we assess 34 European banks’ CDS spread changes over 120 months. 
However, not all financial institutions have CDS over the full period, leaving fewer 
observations and constituting an unbalanced panel of data. Moreover, the sample allotment, 
which is organised according to sub-periods, respectively pre-crisis, acute crisis, less acute 
crisis, Eurozone crisis and the whole sample period, leads to an overall of five panels of data. 
Before proceeding with the models specifications, it is important to check for 
multicollinearity which occurs when the explanatory variables are closely related. This 
constitutes a violation of one of the implicit ordinary least squares assumptions (OLS) that 
there should be no correlation between the independent variables (Brooks, 2008). The 
presence of multicollinearity causes difficulties in examining the individual contribution of 
the explanatory variables to the fit of the estimated regression. Moreover, the high correlation 
between the independent variables makes the regression sensitive to a marginal modification 
in the specification. Furthermore, multicollinearity affects the significance tests and may 
cause problems in drawing precise inferences (Brooks, 2008). Therefore, it is important to 
test for multicollinearity. A possible way to measure the correlation between the explanatory 
variables is to find the correlation matrix. 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix for the whole sample period 
 
 CORR. CBA CEA CEQL CEQV CGLD CIRS CMVL CSWP CTSR DGRD MRET SRET UGRD 
CBA 1,00 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 0,01 -0,01 0,06 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,04 0,03 
CEA 0,00 1,00 0,00 -0,03 0,00 0,04 -0,02 -0,05 0,09 -0,05 0,09 0,10 0,00 
CEQL -0,01 0,00 1,00 -0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,02 -0,06 -0,01 0,00 0,04 0,01 
CEQV -0,01 -0,03 -0,13 1,00 -0,07 0,00 -0,06 -0,08 0,15 -0,01 0,02 0,04 0,02 
CGLD 0,01 0,00 0,02 -0,07 1,00 0,62 0,00 0,02 -0,04 0,00 0,14 0,02 0,02 
CIRS -0,01 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,62 1,00 -0,08 -0,11 -0,02 -0,01 0,33 0,15 0,02 
CMVL 0,06 -0,02 0,02 -0,06 0,00 -0,08 1,00 0,39 0,11 -0,05 0,02 0,04 0,00 
CSWP 0,04 -0,05 0,02 -0,08 0,02 -0,11 0,39 1,00 -0,10 0,00 -0,23 -0,12 0,00 
CTSR 0,01 0,09 -0,06 0,15 -0,04 -0,02 0,11 -0,10 1,00 -0,04 -0,02 0,07 0,00 
DGRD 0,00 -0,05 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 -0,05 0,00 -0,04 1,00 -0,11 -0,11 -0,01 
MRET 0,04 0,09 0,00 0,02 0,14 0,33 0,02 -0,23 -0,02 -0,11 1,00 0,50 0,00 
SRET 0,04 0,10 0,04 0,04 0,02 0,15 0,04 -0,12 0,07 -0,11 0,50 1,00 0,01 
UGRD 0,03 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,01 1,00 
 
The table reports the correlation matrix, which includes the pair-wise correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables over the 
period January 2004 – December 2013. CBA is the monthly change in the CDS bid-ask spread (in basis points). CDS bid-ask spread 
is calculated as the bid-ask quotes difference divided by the bid-ask midpoint. CEA is the monthly change in Total Equity/Total 
Assets ratio (percentage points). CEQL is the monthly change in equity liquidity proxied by the equity bid-ask spread. Equity bid-ask 
is computed as the bid-ask difference divided by the bid-ask midpoint. CEQV is the change in equity volatility, which is based on the 
monthly change in the historical standard deviation calculated based on a 12-month rolling window of the monthly stock returns of 
the corresponding entity (percentage points). CGLD is the monthly change in the 10-year benchmark government bond yield 
(percentage points). CIRS is the monthly change in the 5-year interest rate swap. CMVL is the monthly change in market volatility, 
where the VSTOXX index is used as a proxy for market volatility. CSWP is the monthly change in the LIBOR-OIS swap spread       
(percentage points). CTSR is the monthly change in the term structure slope (percentage points). DGRD is the credit rating 
downgrade. MRET is the market return, calculated as the return on the STOXX Europe 600 index. SRET is the monthly stock returns 
of the underlying bank. UGRD is the credit rating upgrade. 
 
 Gujarati (2004) suggests that according to a rule of thumb, multicollinearity causes 
severe problems only if the pair-wise correlations are in excess of 0,80. The strongest 
observable correlation is between changes in the benchmark government bond yield and the 
euro interest rate swap, respectively 0,62. However, both these measures are proxies for the 
change in the risk-free rate and are not simultaneously used in regressions. The other pair-
wise correlation coefficients do not exceed 0,50 indicating that none of the other correlations 
is problematic. Correlation matrices are also constructed for all sub-periods (Appendix D), 
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confirming that besides the two proxies for risk free rate none of the elements in the matrices 
is bigger or equal to the threshold of 0,80. 
 In this study, we utilize two approaches to account for CDS determinants, 
respectively pooled models and panel data estimators, namely fixed and random effects 
models. 
 
3.5.1.  Pooled Models 
 
The starting point is the pooled regression which includes both cross-sectionally and 
time-varying explanatory variables. The pooled model treats data entirely as a cross-sectional 
regression without taking into consideration latent bank heterogeneity and time variation. By 
consequence, this model implies the same intercepts for each bank and each time period, and 
no correlation between the error terms.  
We use two measures for leverage, namely the ratio of Total Equity/Total Assets and 
banks’ stock returns. Thus, we have two pooled models to account for them. Each pooled 
model is run for the full period and also for the sub-periods. 
We define the first pooled regression as follows. 
 
Model 1: 
                                                  
                                                                
          ,                                                                                                                              (I) 
where we denote         as the change in the CDS spread of bank i at time t;    as the 
intercept;        as the change in leverage proxied by Total Equity/Total Assets ratio; 
        as the change in equity volatility;         as the change in the risk-free rate proxied 
by the interest rate swap;         as the credit rating downgrade;         as the credit rating 
upgrade;        as the change in the CDS bid-ask spread;         as the change in equity 
bid-ask spread;         as the change in the term structure slope;         as the market 
return;          as the change in market volatility;         as the change in the swap 
spread. 
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In addition to this, we test another model specification with the benchmark 
government bond yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate instead of the interest rate swap. The 
obtained results are presented in Appendix E. 
Relatively to Model 1, in the second model the accounting leverage is substituted with 
the market proxy for leverage, namely entity-specific stock returns, yielding the following 
specification. 
 
Model 2: 
                                                   
                                                             
          ,                                                                                                                (II) 
where we denote         as the change in CDS spread of bank i at time t;    as the intercept; 
        as the banks’ stock returns;         as the change in equity volatility;         as the 
change in the risk-free rate proxied by the interest rate swap;         as the credit rating 
downgrade;         as the credit rating upgrade;        as the change in CDS bid-ask 
spread;         as the change in equity bid-ask spread;         as the change in the term 
structure slope;        as the market return;          as the change in market volatility; 
        as the change in swap spread. 
In the same manner as above, we run an additional model, where we substitute the 
riskless rate proxy, namely the interest rate swap with the benchmark government bond yield. 
Appendix F reports the corresponding results. 
In order to ensure the reliability of our results, we test the classical ordinary least 
squares assumption of homoscedasticity, which posits that “the variance of the errors is 
constant” (Brooks, 2008: 132). In the presence of non-constant variance, errors are 
heteroscedastic. The underlying issue associated with heteroscedasticity is that the inferences 
drawn from the regression are not reliable. In order to test for this problem, we manually 
perform the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test, whose results are presented in the table 
below. 
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Table 3. BPG test results for Models 1 – 2 
 
  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis  
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
Model 1         
F-statistic 2,07 3,85 2,71 5,45 5,06 
Prob. 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Model 2         
F-statistic 2,00 12,96 5,70 5,70 5,41 
Prob. 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 
The table shows the F-statistics and associated p-values (prob.) obtained in the BPG tests. The null hypothesis of this test 
posits that the errors are homoscedastic. The employed statistical significance level is 5 %. The heteroscedasticity test is run 
for the two pooled models in all the sub-periods as well as during the whole sample period. More specifically, Model 1 
utilizes accounting leverage. Model 2 includes stock returns as a proxy for leverage. The BPG tests results for the additional 
tested specifications that differ from Model 1 and Model 2 by employing benchmark the government bond yield as risk-free 
rate proxy are presented in Appendix E and F. 
 
The obtained BPG results posit that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity can be 
rejected in Models 1 and 2 in all of the sub-periods as well as the whole period. This implies 
that errors are heteroscedastic. In order to eliminate the heteroscedasticity and correct the 
standard errors, we employ White’s robust standard errors. 
 
3.5.2. Fixed and Random Effects Models 
 
Some of the employed explanatory variables only vary over time but not over the 
cross-sections, mainly the market-wide factors, such as the term structure slope, the market 
return, market volatility and the swap spread. Therefore, in the second approach we aim to 
account for the role of these factors in explaining the CDS spread changes in a different 
manner than in the pooled regressions. Instead of including explanatory variables that only 
vary over time, we aim to account for them as well as the additional market influences by 
controlling for time-specificity using two panel data estimators, namely fixed effects and 
random effects models. This approach enables more insights into the explanatory power of 
the cross-sectionally varying determinants as the observed results are compared with the ones 
obtained in the pooled models. Moreover, in finding the appropriate model specification, we 
also test for the presence of cross-sectional heterogeneity. 
Fixed effects and random effects models enable accounting for cross-sectional 
heterogeneity or for time specificity. The fixed effects model can take into consideration the 
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variation in both the time and cross-sectional dimension (Brooks, 2008) at the same time, but 
due to the unbalanced panel of data, the random effects cannot. Moreover, the unbalanced 
panel of data restricts the estimation of the model with both fixed and random effects in 
different dimensions.  
The fixed effects approach can be implemented by incorporating dummy variables, 
known as the least squares dummy variable model (LSDV). This approach captures the 
heterogeneity and leads to cross-sectionally different intercepts in the regression         
(Brooks, 2008). In case of time-fixed effects, the intercept becomes time-varying and captures 
the independent variables “that vary over time, but are constant cross-sectionally”             
(Brooks, 2008: 493). However, the period fixed effects cannot be included if the panel data 
contains determinants that do not vary across the entities. The reason behind this is the fact 
that incorporating regressors that only vary over time constitutes perfect collinearity with the 
period-fixed effects dummies. Finally, Gujarati (2004) addresses the drawback of the LSDV 
model, which is the large loss of degrees of freedom associated with the inclusion of a 
number of dummy variables.  
The random effects model or error component model (ECM) circumvents the problem 
of the large loss of degrees of freedom and can be seen as a more efficient panel data 
estimator (Kennedy, 2009).  The main difference of the error component model relative to the 
fixed effects model is given by the fact that “the intercept represents the mean value of all the 
(cross-sectional) intercepts and the error component represents the (random) deviation of 
individual intercept from this mean value” (Gujarati, 2004: 648). Moreover, Wooldridge 
(2002) addresses the fact that the random effects model imposes more assumptions beyond 
the ones of classical ordinary least squares (OLS). In particular, if there is a correlation 
between the explanatory variable and the individual error component, then the random effects 
model gives biased coefficient estimates (Gujarati, 2004). 
We exclude the independent variables that vary only over time, such as the risk-free 
rate, the term structure slope, market return, market volatility, and the swap spread. The third 
model contains variables that vary both cross-sectionally and over time, allowing further 
insights into the explanatory power of these determinants. This model incorporates Total 
Equity/Total Assets ratio as a measure of leverage. The exact model specification can be seen 
below.  
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Model 3: 
                                                     
                                                                                                                             (III)                             
where we denote         as the change in the CDS spread of bank i at time t;    as the 
intercept;        as the change in leverage proxied by Total Equity/Total Assets ratio; 
        as the change in equity volatility;         as the credit rating downgrade;         
as the credit rating upgrade;        as the change in the CDS bid-ask spread;         as the 
change in the equity bid-ask spread. 
Similarly to Model 3, the determinants utilized in the fourth model vary in both 
dimensions.  However, the current model contains bank stock returns as a proxy for leverage 
instead of Total Equity/Total Assets. The form of this model is presented below.  
 
Model 4: 
                                                   
                  ,                    (IV) 
where we denote         as the change in CDS spread of bank i at time t;    as the intercept; 
        as the banks’ stock returns;         as the change in equity volatility;         as the 
credit rating downgrade;         as the credit rating upgrade;        as the change in bid-ask 
spread;         as the change in equity bid-ask spread. 
We aim to assess the presence of heterogeneity in the time or cross-sectional 
dimensions or both.  In the case when there is heterogeneity, it implies that the error terms 
follow a correlation pattern. In particular, cross-sectional heterogeneity might cause error 
terms to systematically deviate from zero within each cross-sectional unit, whereas the 
presence of time-specificity might result in the residuals’ correlation across banks during 
particular time periods.  
The starting point in the selection of the appropriate fixed effects specification is a 
Redundant Fixed Effects test. Results of this test show whether the fixed-effects dummy 
variables should be employed in the regressions. The table below provides the summary of 
the obtained test results. 
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Table 4.  Redundant Fixed Effects test results for Model 3 
  
Fixed Effects  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
Cross-section 
fixed 
Statistic F 0,07 0,75 2,70 0,07 0,22 
Df (20, 635) (27, 468) (31, 813) (321, 322) (322, 834) 
Prob. 1,00 0,81 0,00 1,00 1,00 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 1,42 21,35 83,34 2,31 7,23 
Df 20 27 31 32 32 
Prob. 1,00 0,77 0,00 1,00 1,00 
Period fixed 
Statistic F 34,70 14,15 13,94 12,84 10,7 
Df (36, 619) (20, 475) (31, 812) (42, 1312) (112, 2754) 
Prob. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 731,24 234,13 372,20 468,64 1038,14 
Df 36 20 32 42 112 
Prob. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Fixed-Fixed 
Statistic F  21,88 6,70 9,86 7,22 8,39 
Df (56, 599) (47, 448) (63, 781) (74, 1280) (144, 2722) 
Prob. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 737,35 266,79 497,26 474,7 1055,29 
Df 56 47 63 74 144 
Prob. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 
This table presents the results of the Redundant Fixed Effects – Likelihood Ratio Test run on Model 3 which incorporates 
accounting leverage. The three versions of the fixed effects are investigated, namely the entity-fixed effects model (cross-section 
fixed), the time-fixed effects model (period fixed), and the two-way error component model (fixed-fixed). For each version of the 
fixed effects model, the table reports two statistics (the F-statistic and the Chi-square statistic) together with the corresponding 
degrees of freedom (Df) and p-values (Prob.). The redundant test for fixed effects is conducted over the four sub-periods and also 
during the whole sample period. The statistical level of significance is assumed to be 5 %. The null hypothesis of the LSDV 
model states that the fixed effects dummies are jointly equal to zero. A p-value of the F-statistic or Chi-square statistic that is less 
than 0,05 suggests that the null hypothesis should be rejected and that the fixed effects model should be utilized.   
 
It can be seen that there is no heterogeneity in the cross-sectional dimension in the 
regressions run over the pre-crisis, acute phase of the financial crisis, Eurozone crisis        
sub-period as well as throughout the whole sample period. Nonetheless, the obtained results 
posit that it is necessary to include cross-sectional fixed effects in the less acute crisis 
regression. With regard to the time-specificity, it can be concluded that there is heterogeneity 
in the period dimension and it is necessary to account for it in all the regressions. Fixed 
effects in both dimensions should be applied to the regression run over the less acute phase of 
the financial crisis as the three versions of the Redundant Fixed Effects test show the 
necessity to account for heterogeneity in both dimensions. 
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In the next step, in order to determine whether the random effects model can be 
employed, the Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test is used. As mentioned before, the 
random effects model is based on more assumptions than the classical OLS, therefore, this 
test helps to indicate the viability of employing the random effects model. Table 5 depicts the 
Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test results. 
 
Table 5.  Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test results for Model 3 
 
Random Effects Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
Period Random 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 12,90 5,91 13,59 28,34 33,52 
Df 6 5 5 6 6 
Prob. 0,04 0,32 0,02 0,00 0,00 
Cross-Section 
Random 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 0,85 11,20 57,51 1,75 5,56 
Df 6 5 5 6 6 
Prob. 0,99 0,04 0,00 0,94 0,47 
 
This table shows the outcome of the Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test run on Model 3 which incorporates Total 
Equity/Total Assets ratio as a proxy for leverage. The two alternatives of the random effects model are investigated, namely 
the time (period random) and cross-sectional dimension (cross-section random). The Chi-square statistic (Statistic Chi-sqr.), 
the degrees of freedom (Df) and the p-values (Prob.) are reported for each version of the test. The Correlated Random 
Effects-Hausman test for random effects is reported over all sub-periods as well as over the whole sample period. The 
assumed statistical level of significance is 5 %. If the p-value of the Chi-square statistic is less than 0,05, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the random effects model is well-specified. Due to the unbalanced panel of data a two-way random effects 
specification cannot be run.  
 
The test results suggest that the period random effects model should be implemented 
in the acute phase of the financial crisis. Even though the Correlated Random               
Effects-Hausman test indicates that, except the regressions run over the two phases of the 
financial crisis, the cross-section random effects should be used in all other specifications, we 
do not employ them in the study. If the cross-sectional fixed effects dummy variables are 
insignificant, this already posits that there is lack of cross-sectional heterogeneity to be 
accounted for. 
Overall, the conclusions with regard to the correct model specification can be drawn 
from both the Redundant Fixed Effects test and the Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test. 
The choice for the pre-crisis, the Eurozone crisis and whole sample period regressions is 
period-fixed effects, whereas for the regression run over the acute phase of the financial crisis 
is the period random effects model. The period random effects model is chosen instead of the 
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period fixed effects model for the acute phase due to the fact that the former model, as 
mentioned before, is considered to be more efficient. As the presence of two-dimension 
heterogeneity is uncovered in the less acute crisis regression, the chosen specification for it is 
period and cross-sectional fixed effects (fixed-fixed). 
Similarly, a Redundant Fixed Effects test is undertaken for Model 4, which differs 
from Model 3 by employing banks’ stock returns as a proxy for leverage. The obtained results 
are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 6. Redundant Fixed Effects test results for Model 4 
 
Fixed Effects  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
Cross-section 
fixed 
Statistic F 0,07 0,58 2,59 0,07 0,19 
Df (20, 635) (27, 468) (31, 813) (32, 1337) (32, 2849) 
Prob. 1,00 0,95 0,00 1,00 1,00 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 1,47 16,59 80,18 2,4 6,32 
Df 20 27 31 32 32 
Prob. 1,00 0,94 0,00 1,00 1,00 
Period fixed 
Statistic F 33,92 15,44 12,77 10,3 8,93 
Df (36, 619) (20, 475) (31,812) (42, 1327) (122,2769) 
Prob. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 721,21 250,96 346,44 388,38 890,63 
Df 36 20 32 42 122 
Prob. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Fixed-Fixed 
Statistic F  21,37 6,92 8,99 5,8 7 
Df (56, 599) (47, 448) (63, 781) (74, 1295) (144, 2737) 
Prob. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 726,88 273,57 463,42 393,82 905,45 
Df 56 47 63 74 144 
Prob. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 
This table presents the results of the Redundant Fixed Effects – Likelihood Ratio test run on Model 4 that incorporates banks’ 
stock returns. The three versions of fixed effects are investigated, namely the entity-fixed effects model (cross-section fixed), 
the time-fixed effects model (period fixed), and the two-way error component model (fixed-fixed). The statistical level of 
significance is assumed to be 5 %. The null hypothesis of the LSDV model states that the fixed effects dummies are jointly 
equal to zero. A p-value of the F-statistic or Chi-square statistic that is less than 0,05 suggests that the null hypothesis should 
be rejected and that the fixed effects model should be utilized. 
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 The results in Table 6 show that there is no need to account for cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in almost all the sub-periods as well as the whole period in the current model. 
The notable exception is the regression run over the less acute phase of the financial crisis. As 
far as the period effects are concerned, the associated probabilities of the Redundant Fixed 
Effects test are equal to 0,00 indicating that the null hypothesis can be rejected and the period 
fixed effects model should be employed in all the sub-samples. Both cross-sectional and 
period fixed effects should be used in the regression run over the less acute phase of the 
financial crisis as there is a strong evidence of heterogeneity in the time as well as           
cross-sectional dimensions.  
 In addition to this, in order to determine whether the assumptions behind the random 
effects model are satisfied, the Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test is run. The 
outcomes of the test are shown in the table 7. 
 
Table 7. Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test results for Model 4  
 
Random Effects Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
Period Random 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 10,69 6,59 8,19 36,96 44,19 
Df 6 5 5 6 6 
Prob. 0,10 0,25 0,15 0,00 0,00 
Cross-Section 
Random 
Statistic Chi-sqr. 0,76 6,94 54,86 1,69 4,66 
Df 6 5 5 6 6 
Prob. 0,99 0,23 0,00 0,95 0,59 
 
This table depicts the outcome of the Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test run on Model 4 which incorporates stock returns 
as a proxy for leverage. The two alternatives of the random effects model are investigated, namely the time (period random) and 
cross-sectional dimension (cross-section random). The Chi-square statistic (Statistic Chi-sqr.), the degrees of freedom (Df) and 
the p-values (Prob.) are reported for each version of the test. The Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test for random effects is 
reported over all sub-periods as well as over the whole sample period. The assumed statistical level of significance is 5 %. If the 
p-value of the Chi-square statistic is less than 0,05, we reject the null hypothesis that the random effects model is well-specified.  
 
The probabilities of the Correlated Random Effects-Hausman test for the period 
dimension exceed 5 % in the regressions for pre-crisis and the two phases of the financial 
crisis, thus indicating that the period random effects model is well-specified and should be 
used in these sub-periods. For the cross-sectional dimension, the random effects model should 
be employed for all regressions with the exception of the less acute phase of the financial 
crisis. However, the two-ways random effects model cannot be run when the associated panel 
data is unbalanced. 
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 To conclude, based on the obtained results, we choose the period-random effects 
specification when estimating the regressions for the pre-crisis and acute crisis. Both period 
and cross-section fixed effects are chosen to be applied to the regression for the less acute 
crisis as the Redundant Fixed Effects test proves the existence of heterogeneity in the two 
dimensions. Lastly, we select the period fixed effects for the Eurozone crisis and the whole 
sample period instead of the cross-section random effects. This is motivated by the fact that 
the Redundant Fixed Effects test shows no heterogeneity in the cross-sectional dimension, 
thus indicating that it is not necessary to account for it. 
Finally, we report the results of the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroscedasticity 
in both models. This test is run for all possible fixed and random effects model specifications 
(not reported). The following table presents the outcomes of the tests for the models chosen 
according to the Redundant Fixed Effects or the Correlated Random Effects-Hausman tests. 
 
Table 8. BPG test results for Models 3– 4 
 
  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis  
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
  Period           
Fixed 
Period 
Random 
Fixed    
Fixed 
Period 
Fixed 
Period     
Fixed 
Model 3         
F-statistic 0,33 3,76 3,00 8,41 9,47 
Prob. 0,92 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
  Period       
Random 
Period 
Random 
Fixed    
Fixed 
Period 
Fixed 
Period     
Fixed 
Model 4         
F-statistic 0,87 20,99 12,56 8,16 9,20 
Prob. 0,52 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 
The table shows the F-statistics and associated p-values (Prob.) obtained in the BPG tests. The null hypothesis of this test 
posits that the errors are homoscedastic. The employed statistical significance level is 5 %. The heteroscedasticity test is run 
for the two pooled models in all the sub-periods as well as during the whole sample period. Model 3 utilizes accounting 
leverage, whereas Model 4 incorporates stock returns.  
 
It can be seen that in the pre-crisis sub-sample both models appear to have 
homoscedastic errors. The remaining regressions have non-constant variance of the errors and 
are corrected using the appropriate White‘s robust standard errors.  
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
Our empirical analysis seeks to investigate the impact of not only credit risk, but a 
plethora of other important determinants such as liquidity components, market factors, and 
sector specific factors on the CDS spread changes. We conduct this analysis by examining the 
importance of the explanatory variables over the different periods and models.  
First, we start with the two pooled models (Model 1 and Model 2), which differ with 
respect to the proxy for leverage. Each model contains regressions over the four sub-periods 
(pre-crisis, acute and less acute phase of the financial crisis, Eurozone crisis) as well 
throughout the whole period. The two models are compared relatively to each other.  
In the next step, we examine the other two models (Model 3 and Model 4) that 
incorporate only components that vary both cross-sectionally and over time. Panel data 
estimators are employed in estimating these models. Similarly to the pooled regressions, these 
two models have different measures for leverage. We assess the relative differences of these 
models as compared with the pooled ones. This enables us to draw additional insights into the 
determinants of banks’ CDS spread changes. 
The regression outputs for the first model over the sub-samples as well as throughout the 
whole sample are summarized in the table below. 
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Table 9. Regressions results for Model 1 
 
  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis  
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
Coefficients       
C 0,07 1,24 2,48** 13,10*** 5,04*** 
  (0,71) (0,79) (2,18) (4,05) (3,26) 
Structural Model  Variables         
∆ Equity/Total Assets -0,26 7,57 -0,77 -50,94* -30,70* 
  (-0,81) (0,76) (-0,10) (-1,83) (-1,93) 
∆ Equity Volatility -0,19 -1,19 -3,57*** -1,47 -1,96 
  (-1,03) (-0,62) (-4,76) (-0,79) (-1,37) 
∆ Interest Rate Swap -1,27*** 5,51 1,00 99,83*** 35,71*** 
  (-3,02) (0,73) (0,17) (5,77) (4,61) 
Ratings         
Downgrade -0,67** 19,87* 17,13*** -38,73** -9,23 
  (-2,27) (1,65) (2,69) (-2,43) (-0,83) 
Upgrade -1,07 NA NA -75,95*** -31,31** 
  (-1,58) NA NA (-5,47) (-2,42) 
Liquidity          
∆ CDS Bid-Ask Spread -1,44** -160,02*** -194,16*** -455,37*** -33,72*** 
  (-1,99) (-4,21) (-5,63) (-2,90) (-2,81) 
Equity Liquidity         
∆ Equity Bid-Ask Spread 4,26** 450,73 332,16 -430,78 -218,35 
  (2,05) (1,30) (1,27) (-0,95) (-0,94) 
Market Factors          
∆ Term Structure Slope 6,15** 20,01 11,42 -17,67** -25,60*** 
  (2,42) (1,15) (0,82) (-2,22) (-3,53) 
∆ Market Return -0,08*** -1,10*** -0,99*** -8,85*** -4,16*** 
  (-2,82) (-3,94) (-4,65) (-10,58) (-11,84) 
∆ Market Volatility -0,01 -0,11 -0,03 0,07 -0,03 
  (-0,29) (-0,71) (-0,22) (0,14) (-0,11) 
∆ Swap Spread -44,67*** 26,23*** 23,62*** 161,14*** 30,82*** 
  (-5,98) (4,61) (4,32) (4,12) (3,30) 
           
Adj. R-squared 0,12 0,15 0,21 0,18 0,09 
Nobs. 662 501 850 1361 2873 
 
The table presents the coefficient estimates using the pooled regression. Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. The   
1 % significance level is denoted by ***, the 5 % significance level by ** and respectively the 10 % significance level by *. 
The sample periods are January 2004 to June 2007 (pre-crisis), July 2007 to March 2009 (acute crisis), July 2007 to March 
2010 (less acute crisis), April 2010 to December 2013 (Eurozone crisis), and January 2004 to December 2013 (All). The 
upgrade variable is not included in the regressions for acute and less acute phases as there were no upgrades during these    
sub-periods. In order to account for the credit ratings change, the linear transformation of the credit ratings into numerical 
equivalents: Aaa (20) to C (0), is also examined. Nonetheless, this transformation might lead to biased results as it treats 
upgrade and downgrade events as equally important. Therefore, the results of this alternative approach are not reported. 
Number of observations is denoted by Nobs and it differs in each sub-period as the panel data is unbalanced. 
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It can be observed that the Merton model derived variables have a lack of explanatory 
power in some of the sub-periods. This finding is in line with the study of Collin-Dufresne    
et al. (2001) that emphasizes the deficiency of structural models variables in explaining CDS 
spread changes. However, leverage proxied by Total Equity/Total Assets becomes significant 
at the 10 % level in the Eurozone crisis and also during the whole sample period. As 
expected, the Total Equity/Total Assets coefficient is negative. This follows due to the fact 
that diminishing equity, while holding assets constant, leads to a rise in the Debt/Total Assets 
ratio, which increases the probability of default and respectively the CDS spread. The other 
structural model variable is equity volatility that becomes significant at the 1 % level in less 
acute phase of the financial crisis. The coefficient estimate of this variable is in absolute 
terms largest in this sub-period as compared with the others. Interestingly, the large 
fluctuations in the volatility of the entity-specific stock returns during the less acute phase 
(Appendix C) caused this proxy to reflect better asset volatility. However, consistently with 
the study of Annaert et al. (2013), the corresponding coefficient does not carry the expected 
sign during the financial turmoil. Nevertheless, in their empirical research, Annaert et al. 
(2013) do not observe any influence of this variable. The riskless rate proxied by the interest 
rate swap becomes significant at the 1 % level in pre-crisis, Eurozone crisis and during the 
whole period. This indicates that during the financial crisis banks’ credit spreads are driven 
by other factors than the riskless rate. Nonetheless, in the last two periods the coefficients are 
positive, implying that the increase in the risk-free rate causes a rise in the CDS spread. The 
research of Raunig and Scheicher (2009) also attest the inconsistency related to the sign of the 
risk- free rate in various periods. 
Another variable that is associated with default risk is given by credit ratings. Both 
downgrades and upgrades effects on the CDS spread changes are tested. The coefficient 
estimates of the downgrade variable are statistically significant in all the sub-periods. This 
confirms the existence of a link between the probabilities of default and ratings which is also 
observed by Naifar and Abid (2005). On one hand, downgrades are significant in the acute 
and less acute phases, and exhibit the expected positive relationship with the CDS spread 
changes. On the other hand, downgrades do not have the predicted sign in the pre-crisis and 
Eurozone crisis periods, in which they are also significant. This implies that a downgrade 
induces a lower CDS spread change. However, the coefficient estimates of the downgrade 
variable are statistically significant in all the sub-periods, thus proving the findings of Hull   
et al. (2004) that the CDS spreads anticipate credit events, and this is more pronounced for 
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downgrades. As far as upgrades are concerned, the coefficient estimates of upgrade variable 
in both phases of the financial crisis are not reported as none of the banks were upgraded 
during this interval. The upgrade variable has explanatory power during the Eurozone crisis 
and the whole sample period, respectively 1% and 10% significance levels. This result posits 
that the increase in the creditworthiness of the financial institutions becomes important and 
leads to a lower change of the credit spread in the Eurozone crisis. The reasoning behind this 
is that during this period, the debt markets face a loss of confidence (Calice et al., 2013) and 
the credit ratings upgrade may raise the confidence of the credit derivatives market 
participants. 
The regressions results show that a number of explanatory variables beyond the 
Merton model and credit ratings are statistically significant, thus confirming the belief that an 
increase in the CDS spread is not entirely driven by changes in credit risk. In this respect, the 
liquidity component, given by the change in the CDS bid-ask spread, exhibits strong 
explanatory power in the whole period as well as throughout the sub-periods. Coro                
et al. (2013) also ascertain that the CDS spreads are affected by the CDS liquidity. The 
coefficients are significant at the 1 % level in almost all regressions. Moreover, the negative 
sign of the bid-ask spread coefficients suggest that an increase in the bid-ask spread, which 
indicates lower liquidity, generates a decrease in the CDS spread. This result is consistent 
with the study of Chen et al. (2007) who find a positive relationship between the CDS 
liquidity and the CDS spread. Another observation is the dramatic increase in the bid-ask 
spread coefficient after the start of the financial crisis. This reveals that 1 basis point increase 
in CDS bid-ask spread (decrease in liquidity) leads to 160,02 basis points decrease in CDS 
spread during the acute phase. This trend is even more persistent during the Eurozone crisis, 
where a 1 basis point rise in CDS bid-ask spread is associated with 455,37 basis points 
contraction in the CDS spread. This suggests that liquidity is non-trivial, especially in more 
stressed times, which is also consistent with the study of Beber et al. (2009).  
Regarding equity liquidity, this determinant is statistically significant at the 5 % level 
only prior to the financial crisis. This result is consistent with the findings of Das and 
Hanouna (2009) which imply that an increase in the bid-ask spread, which indicates lower 
liquidity, causes a rise in the CDS spread in the pre-crisis period. Their study shows that 
growing illiquidity in the equity markets, which entails higher bid-ask spreads, causes 
hedging activities to be more expensive, and thus leads to an increase in CDS spreads.  
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However, we find no evidence of the relationship between CDS and equity market liquidity 
since the start of the financial crisis.  
The results also show that the market wide factors are prominent determinants of the 
CDS spread changes, some of them being significant in all periods. The changes in the slope 
of the term structure, which proxy the changes in business cycle, are significant at the 5 % 
level during pre-crisis and the Eurozone crisis, and at the 1 % level during the whole period.  
As expected, this determinant has a negative impact on the last two periods taken into 
consideration. However, the discrepancy is observed with regard to the signs of the 
coefficient estimates, which become positive in the pre-crisis. Nonetheless, according to 
Avramov et al. (2007: 92), “the realized effect of changes in the term structure slope on 
credit-spread changes is an empirical question”.  
Another explanatory variable is given by the market returns, which are highly 
significant at the 1% level in all regressions, and in line with the study of Ericsson et al. 
(2009), have a negative relationship with the CDS spread changes. This shows that the 
decrease in the CDS spread can also be triggered by improved general business conditions 
that respectively lower the probability of default.  
With regard to the changes in market volatility, which are an indicator of the 
uncertainty in the business climate, this determinant does not influence the CDS spread 
changes. Finally, the swap spread changes, which represent a rise or reduction in the banking 
sector risk, are almost in each occasion significant at the 1% level and consistently with the 
study of Dullmann and Sosinska (2007) have a positive relationship with the CDS spread 
changes. This relationship suggests that higher banking sector risk leads to a higher CDS 
spread. The notable exception is the pre-crisis period, during which the change in the swap 
rate exhibits a negative relationship with the dependent variable. This implies that an increase 
in credit risk premium of banks is associated with a decrease in CDS spread. This irregularity 
can be presumably attributable to the demand and supply imbalances in the CDS market prior 
to the financial crisis as addressed by Blanco et al. (2005).  
The studies of Ericsson et al. (2013) and Coro et al. (2013) show that the models on 
credit spread changes explain less than one third of the variation in the credit spread changes. 
This is consistent with the obtained results. Compared with the other sub-periods regressions, 
the one run over the pre-crisis period has the lowest fit. As measured by the adjusted            
R-squared, only 11% of the variation in the CDS spread changes is explained by the included 
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independent variables prior to the financial crisis. This is indicative of the lower sensitivity of 
the CDS spreads during calm periods. However, the overall fit of the model improves in the 
subsequent intervals, especially during the less acute phase, in which the adjusted R-squared 
reaches 22 %. 
Relatively to the first regressions, the second model is altered by incorporating banks’ 
stock returns as a leverage proxy. The regressions results can be seen below. 
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Table 10. Regressions results for Model 2 
 
  
Pre-Crisis Acute  
Crisis  
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
Coefficients  
   
  
C 0,07 0,08 2,00* 11,67*** 3,95*** 
  (0,70) (0,05) (1,83) (3,73) (2,72) 
Structural Model Variables         
Bank Stock Returns -0,01 -0,54 -0,43*** -0,95*** -0,96*** 
  (-0,79) (-1,45) (-2,90) (-3,82) (-5,34) 
  Equity Volatility -0,20 -1,30 -3,12*** -1,18 -1,72 
  (-1,13) (-0,67) (-3,63) (-0,59) (-1,12) 
  Interest Rate Swap -1,25*** 5,73 -0,14 92,63*** 35,03*** 
  (-2,99) (0,77) (-0,02) (5,38) (4,62) 
Ratings         
Downgrade -0,56* 15,36 15,84** -39,04** -11,86 
  (-1,93) (1,23) (2,56) (-2,50) (-1,07) 
Upgrade -1,05 NA NA -75,73*** -28,34** 
  (-1,56) NA NA (-6,59) (-2,17) 
Liquidity          
  CDS Bid-Ask Spread -1,42** -165,66*** -193,82*** -431,06*** -31,41*** 
  (-1,97) (-4,48) (-5,86) (-2,75) (-2,69) 
Equity liquidity         
  Equity Bid-Ask Spread 4,37** 507,67 273,99 -353,37 -182,69 
  (2,07) (1,50) (1,13) (-0,78) (-0,80) 
Market Factors          
  Term Structure Slope 6,02** 18,16 10,13 -19,44** -24,23*** 
  (2,36) (1,03) (0,74) (-2,40) (-3,22) 
Market Return -0,06* -0,40 -0,32 -7,53*** -2,80*** 
  (-1,85) (-0,95) (-1,32) (-8,97) (-7,51) 
  Market Volatility -0,01 -0,10 -0,05 0,30 0,05 
  (-0,34) (-0,61) (-0,38) (0,62) (0,22) 
 Swap Spread -44,67*** 30,66*** 27,51*** 130,03*** 30,55*** 
  (-6,02) (5,17) (5,02) (3,21) (3,45) 
  
    
  
Adj. R-squared 0,12 0,17 0,24 0,18 0,11 
Nobs. 662 501 850 1361 2873 
 
The table presents the coefficient estimates using the pooled regression. Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. The   
1 % significance level is denoted by ***, the 5 % significance level by ** and respectively the 10 % significance level by *. 
The sample periods are January 2004 to June 2007 (pre-crisis), July 2007 to March 2009 (acute crisis), July 2007 to March 
2010 (less acute crisis), April 2010 to December 2013 (Eurozone crisis) and January 2004 to December 2013 (All). The 
upgrade variable is not included in the regressions for acute and less acute phases as there were no upgrades during these   
sub-periods. Number of observations is denoted by Nobs and it differs in each sub-period as the panel data is unbalanced. 
 
In the current regression specification, the leverage proxy, namely banks’ stock 
returns are highly significant in the less acute phase, the Eurozone crisis and the whole 
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sample period, whereas in the first model, the changes in the Total Equity/Total Assets ratio 
are only significant in the Eurozone crisis and the whole sample period at a lower confidence 
level. These observations entail that the market proxy for leverage given by the entity-specific 
stock returns has more influence over the CDS spread changes. Contrary to Das et al. (2006), 
the accounting proxy for leverage does not perform better than the market measure. However, 
both proxies for leverage are not significant in the acute phase of the financial crisis. This 
contradicts the theory behind the structural credit risk models, which implies that “the default 
option is less out-of-the-money in the crisis period implying that changes in leverage should 
have a higher impact on default risk” (Annaert et al., 2013: 14).  
Furthermore, banks’ stock returns exhibit the expected negative relationship with the 
credit spread changes. This means that negative stock returns, which entail higher leverage, 
lead to an increase in the CDS spread.  
With respect to the other Merton-derived variables, the two models display similar 
patterns. In the current model, the structural model variables are also insignificant in the acute 
phase of the crisis. Moreover, the two models are consistent regarding the significance of the 
changes in equity volatility and the interest rate swap.  
Contrary to the results in Model 1, the downgrade explanatory variable becomes 
insignificant in the acute phase of the financial crisis. Another difference between the two 
models is that the market return changes lose their explanatory power during the two phases 
of the financial crisis. This is attributable to the exact regression specification and inclusion of 
banks’ stock returns.  
The other independent variables exhibit a similar significance, magnitude and sign 
with the previous model. Relatively to the results of the first regression specification, this 
model’s overall fit, prior to crisis, is only 12 % as measured by the adjusted R-squared. In the 
subsequent sub-periods, the overall fit of the model continues to increase, with a peak of 24% 
in the less acute phase.  
In the next step, we address the results obtained in the models that include regressors 
that vary in both the time and cross-sectional dimensions and employ fixed or random effects. 
We start with providing the summary of the regressions results for Model 3 over the 
considered four sub-periods and the whole period. The outcomes of the Model 3 can be seen 
in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Regressions results for Model 3 
 
  
Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
  
Period 
fixed 
Period 
random 
Fixed-   
Fixed 
Period   
fixed 
Period  
fixed 
Coefficients       
      
Structural Model Variables         
  Equity/Total Assets 0,09 9,24 10,11 -36,10 -19,87 
  (0,50)  (1,51)  (1,47) (-1,19)  (-1,09) 
  Equity Volatility -0,07 -1,29 -3,18*** -2,01** -1,66*** 
  (-0,65) (-0,99)  (-3,52) (-2,05)  (-2,99) 
Ratings         
Downgrade -1,05 17,28 3,25 -57,32*** -34,31** 
  (-0,82) (1,50)  (0,53) (-2,80)  (-2,30) 
Upgrade -0,61 NA NA -35,29** -15,41** 
  (-1,05) NA NA (-2,36)  (-2,44) 
Liquidity          
  CDS Bid-Ask Spread -0,48 -84,09 -105,26*** -357,09* -21,36* 
  (-1,60) (-1,62)  (-3,61) (-1,69)  (-1,68) 
Equity liquidity         
  Equity Bid-Ask Spread 1,40 290,32 140,47 -396,15 -162,04 
  (0,77)  (0,78)  (0,59) (-0,88)  (-0,69) 
         
Adj. R-squared  0,66 0,03 0,48 0,30 0,29 
Nobs. 662 501 850 1361 2888 
 
The table presents the coefficient estimates using fixed or random effects panel data estimators. Associated t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. The 1 % significance level is denoted by ***, the 5 % significance level by ** and respectively the      
10 % significance level by *. The sample periods are January 2004 to June 2007 (pre-crisis), July 2007 to March 2009   
(acute crisis), July 2007 to March 2010 (less acute crisis), April 2010 to December 2013 (Eurozone crisis), and January 2004 
to December 2013 (All). The upgrade variable is not included in the regressions for acute and less acute phases as there were 
no upgrades during these sub-periods. Number of observations is denoted by Nobs and it differs in each sub-period as the 
panel data is unbalanced. 
 
We aim to analyse and address the main differences of Model 3 as compared with the 
pooled regressions of Model 1 as they employ the same proxy for leverage, namely 
Equity/Total Assets.   
Some explanatory variables become statistically significant as compared to the pooled 
regression (I), when fixed or random effects are used. The reasoning behind this is that these 
effects may diminish the variance of the error terms, thus improving the accuracy of the 
coefficient estimates. The other situation is when an independent variable is statistically 
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significant in the pooled regression, but loses its explanatory power when employing panel 
estimator approaches (fixed or random effects). This happens as the effects may better 
capture the part of CDS spread changes that are supposed to be explained by another variable 
in the pooled regression.  
Contrary to the regression results obtained in the mentioned pooled regressions, in this 
model, the Total Equity/Total Assets proxy for leverage becomes insignificant during the 
Eurozone crisis as well as during the whole period. This occurs due to the fact that the period 
random effects may pick what is explained by the Total Equity/Total Assets ratio in the 
pooled Model 1. This shows that the change in accounting leverage has no influence on the 
CDS spread changes.  
Moreover, during the Eurozone crisis as well as over the whole sample period, the 
changes in equity volatility are statistically significant, as compared to the corresponding 
pooled Model 1. The accuracy of the associated coefficient estimates may have improved due 
to the applied period random effects that have presumably reduced the variance of the error 
terms. This determinant negatively affects the CDS spread changes, thus contradicting the 
expectation that an increase in equity volatility will lead to a higher probability of default and, 
respectively to a rise in the CDS spread.  
As far as ratings are concerned, one of the main findings is that the downgrade 
variable loses its explanatory power in the pre-crisis as well as the two phases of the financial 
crisis, whereas it is highly significant in Model 1. The opposite tendency is observed when 
analysing the whole period as this determinant becomes statistically significant at the 5 % 
level. The coefficient estimates of the upgrade variable exhibit the same signs and similar 
significance but the magnitude of the associated coefficients, during the Eurozone crisis, 
decreases relatively to the outcomes of the regressions (I).  
Furthermore, the changes in the CDS bid-ask spread become insignificant in the      
pre-crisis and acute phase of financial crisis. This outcome suggests that the use of period 
fixed effects prior to crisis as well as period random effects during the acute phase may 
substitute this explanatory variable in these sub-periods. The mentioned effects presumably 
capture, to a greater extent, something common to what is explained by the CDS bid-ask 
spread changes in the pooled regressions. Furthermore, during the Eurozone crisis and the 
whole sample period, the liquidity proxy manifests a decrease in significance from the 1 % 
level in the pooled regressions to the 10 % level in the current model.  
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Lastly, although pooled Model 1 displays that the change in equity liquidity appears to 
be a statistically significant determinant of the CDS spread changes prior to the crisis, in the 
current model the change in equity liquidity entails no influence over the analysed dependent 
variable in all the sub-samples considered. 
Next, we present the results for the fourth model which differs from the third one with 
respect to the leverage proxy. The regression outputs in all the intervals considered are shown 
in the table below. 
   
Table 12. Regressions results for Model 4 
 
  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis  
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
  
Period 
random 
Period 
random 
Fixed-   
Fixed 
Period    
fixed 
Period 
fixed 
Coefficients       
      
Structural Model  Variables         
Bank Stock Returns -0,01 -0,71** -0,38*** -0,55*** -0,52*** 
  (-0,85) (-2,20)  (-3,06)  (-2,72)  (-4,21) 
  Equity Volatility -0,08 -1,59 -3,03*** -1,78** -1,60*** 
  (-0,77) (-1,00)  (-3,08)  (-1,99)  (-2,90) 
Ratings         
Downgrade -1,03 10,84 1,27 -56,64*** -35,14** 
  (-0,81) (1,04)  (0,83) (-2,79)  (-2,41) 
Upgrade -0,63 NA NA -40,44*** -15,76** 
  (-1,09) NA NA (-4,66)  (-2,28) 
Liquidity          
  CDS Bid-Ask Spread -0,51* -83,01 -107,53*** -347,11* -20,58* 
  (-1,70) (-1,61)  (-3,77) (-1,69)  (-1,66) 
Equity Liquidity         
  Equity Bid-Ask Spread 1,60 334,87 96,59 -351,99 -146,93 
  (0,88) (1,00)  (0,49) (-0,77)  (-0,63) 
          
Adj. R-squared  0,00 0,09 0,50 0,30 0,29 
Nobs. 662 501 850 1361 2888 
 
The table presents the coefficient estimates using fixed or random effects panel data estimators. Associated t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. The 1 % significance level is denoted by ***, the 5 % significance level by ** and respectively the       
10 % significance level by *. The sample periods are January 2004 to June 2007 (pre-crisis), July 2007 to March 2009   
(acute crisis), July 2007 to March 2010 (less acute crisis), April 2010 to December 2013 (Eurozone crisis) and January 2004 
to December 2013 (All). The upgrade variable is not included in the regressions for acute and less acute phases as there were 
no upgrades during these sub-periods. Number of observations is denoted by Nobs and it differs in each sub-period as the 
panel data is unbalanced. 
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Relatively to the pooled Model 2, which also incorporates a market proxy for 
leverage, the stock returns become statistically significant at the 5 % level in the acute phase 
of the financial crisis. The coefficient of this variable is negative, in line with the theoretical 
assumption that negative stock returns lead to a higher leverage, and thus increase the credit 
risk. Also, the other structural model variable, given by the change in equity volatility, turns 
out to be significant in the Eurozone crisis sub-period and during the full period. This is due 
to the use of period random effects that contribute to an increase in the accuracy of the 
coefficient estimates.  
Ratings downgrades loss their explanatory power in the regression for pre-crisis and 
the less acute phase. However, they become statistically significant at the 5% level 
throughout the full period. This variable maintains the same puzzling results as in the pooled 
models as the coefficient sign is negative during the last two periods analysed. This indicates 
that a downgrade is associated with a decrease in the CDS spread. Results with regard to the 
upgrade variable are similar to the ones obtained in pooled Model 2.  
Another difference is observed in the behavior of the CDS liquidity component that by 
comparison with Model 2 loses its significance in the acute phase. This happens as the period 
random effects may capture what is explained by the CDS bid-ask spread changes in the 
pooled models.  
Lastly, the equity liquidity changes appear to be insignificant in all sub-periods and 
the whole sample period. This result differs from Model 2 which shows that this variable 
impacts the CDS spread changes in the pre-crisis. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this study, we analyse the determinants of the credit default swaps changes of 34 
European banks. Our study extends the related body of empirical works by taking into 
consideration the financial institutions that are insufficiently examined due to their specific 
features such as asset opacity and regulatory requirements, and by employing a rich set of 
explanatory variables beyond those used in previous studies. This paper further contributes to 
past research works by investigating the changes in CDS drivers during four sub-periods 
covering both calm and turbulent times (pre-crisis, acute phase and less acute phase of the 
financial crisis, and the most recent European sovereign debt crisis) as well as during the          
10-year sample period between January 2004 and December 2013. 
In order to assess the determinants of CDS in more detail, we include credit ratings 
upgrades and downgrades in addition to the theoretical determinants of default risk based on 
the Merton (1974) model (leverage, volatility and risk-free rate). We further extend our 
analysis by incorporating two liquidity components related to the CDS market and the equity 
market, as well as several variables that should capture sector specificity, market and general 
economic conditions. The obtained results ensue after employing several different model 
specifications: pooled models and models with fixed or random effects.  
 Our findings from the pooled models appear to highlight that the credit risk variables 
implied by the structural models cannot be perceived as prominent drivers of banks’ CDS 
spreads. In particular, leverage, risk-free rate and equity volatility have no explanatory power 
in some of the sub-periods. Both proxies for leverage, namely balance sheet leverage and 
stock returns, manifest their explanatory power after the start of the financial crisis. This 
shows that in turbulent times, the default risk is more strongly influenced by the increase in 
leverage. Moreover, it is uncovered that the market proxy for leverage, namely banks’ stock 
returns, is a more influential determinant of the CDS spread changes than the other measure 
of leverage represented by Equity/Total Assets. Furthermore, it is observed that the balance 
sheet proxy for leverage has no impact on the dependent variable in the models with fixed or 
random effects. This indicates that the employed effects can better capture the variation in the 
CDS spread changes that was previously explained by the accounting leverage.  
Another finding is that the performance of ratings downgrades as an explanatory 
variable greatly fluctuates over the various periods, whereas the ratings upgrades show a 
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steady pattern throughout all models and sub-periods considered. As such, downgrades 
exhibit explanatory power mainly during the less acute phase of the financial crisis and the 
European sovereign debt crisis in the pooled models, while the upgrades are always 
influential after the financial crisis as well as throughout the entire period. This dynamics 
emphasizes that credit ratings changes become important drivers of the CDS spread 
fluctuations in more turbulent times during which the market expresses a higher interest 
towards probabilities of default. The reason behind this is that credit ratings may contain 
relevant information for the probabilities of default.   
In addition, the obtained results posit that the increase in banks’ CDS spread is not 
entirely driven by credit risk. More specifically, the CDS liquidity is embedded in CDS 
spreads. In the pooled models, CDS liquidity appears to be a highly significant factor 
throughout all the sub-samples, whereas when using panel data estimators (fixed or random 
effects models), the CDS liquidity becomes an influential determinant mainly since the 
financial crisis. The opposite finding is obtained when taking into account equity liquidity. 
The pooled models suggest that banks’ CDS spread changes are influenced by the 
fluctuations in equity liquidity only before the onset of the financial crisis. However, equity 
liquidity loses its statistical significance when fixed or random effects are introduced, thus 
proving that there is a lack of equity liquidity impact on the European banks’ CDS. 
Furthermore, the sector specific, market factors, and business climate proxies, prevail 
in explaining the CDS spread changes as compared to the variables inspired by the Merton 
(1974) model. In this respect, the changes in the swap spread manifest an influence on the 
changes in the CDS spread in all the analysed pooled models and over all the sub-periods 
included. This finding suggests that the banking sector intrinsic credit risk is a prominent 
source of influence. The market return and changes in the slope of the term structure also 
appear to be important drivers of the CDS premium changes. However, the market wide 
volatility changes do not seem to play any role in explaining the variation in the dependent 
variable regardless of the period and model specification, indicating that uncertainty about 
future economic prospects does not affect financial institutions’ CDS.  
  All in all, our results provide strong evidence that banks’ CDS spread changes are 
greatly affected by liquidity and market wide factors. Moreover, these factors are found to 
fluctuate over the different periods analysed. The overall findings have implications for the 
financial regulators who take into consideration the banks’ CDS spreads when monitoring the 
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banking industry’s stability. More specifically, banks’ supervisors should alter their decisions 
based on the different signals that are generated if the credit spread change is driven by either 
market, credit or liquidity risk. Furthermore, they should undertake a timely assessment of the 
banks’ CDS spreads in order to account for their variation over time.  
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7. Appendix 
 
A:  Sample of the banks 
 
Country Banks 
Austria 
Erste Group Bank  AG                                                      
Raiffeisen Bank International AG 
Belgium KBC Group N.V. 
Denmark Danske Bank A/S                                                               
France 
BNP Paribas S.A.                                                       
Credit Agricole S.A.                                                   
Natixis                                                                       
Societe Generale Group 
Germany Commerzbank AG 
Greece 
Alpha Bank A.E.                                                             
Eurobank Ergasias S.A.                                                
National Bank of Greece S.A.                               
Piraeus Bank  Societe Anonyme 
Ireland 
The Governor and Company of the Bank of 
Ireland 
Italy 
Banca Monte dei Paschi S.p.A.                                   
Banca Popolare di Milano Scarl                                    
Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa Scarl                           
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.   
UniCredit S.p.A  
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa                                                 
UniCredit S.p.A.                                                
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa                                                 
Portugal 
Banco BPI S.A.                                                        
Banco Comercial Portugues S.A.                                 
Banco Espirito Santo S.A. 
Spain 
Bankinter S.A.                                                                    
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A.                                                                  
Banco de Sabadell S.A.                                            
Banco Popular Espanol S.A.                                 
Banco Santander S.A. 
Sweden 
Nordea Bank AB                                             
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB                             
Swedbank AB                                                      
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 
United 
Kingdom 
HSBC Holdings PLC                                            
Standard Chartered PLC                                                       
The Royal Bank Of Scotland PLC 
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B:  Augumented-Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test  
 
  Ho: series has unit root 
Banks ADF test statistic p-value 
Alpha Bank A.E. -0,58  0,46 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.  -0,84  0,35 
Banca Popolare di Milano Scarl -0,92  0,32 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. -0,72  0,40 
Banco BPI S.A. -0,57  0,47 
Banco Comercial Português S.A. -1,39  0,15 
Banco de Sabadell S.A. -1,06  0,26 
Banco Espírito Santo S.A. -0,81  0,37 
Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa Scarl -0,86  0,34 
Banco Popular Espanol S.A. -0,91  0,32 
Banco Santander, S.A.  -0,66  0,43 
Bankinter S.A. -0,93  0,31 
BNP Paribas S.A. -0,78  0,38 
Commerzbank AG -0,33  0,57 
Credit Agricole S.A. -1,58 0,49 
Danske Bank A/S -1,39 0,58 
Erste Group Bank AG -2,97 0,04 
Eurobank Ergasias S.A. -2,24 0,20 
HSBC Holdings plc -0,65  0,44 
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. -1,48 0,54 
KBC Group N.V. -1,65 0,46 
National Bank of Greece S.A. -1,99 0,29 
Natixis -1,89 0,34 
Nordea Bank AB -1,94 0,31 
Piraeus Bank Société Anonyme  -0,45  0,52 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG -0,76  0,38 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB -2,03 0,27 
Societe Generale Group -1,50 0,53 
Swedbank AB -2,00 0,29 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB -2,36 0,16 
The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland -1,69 0,43 
The Royal Bank Of Scotland PLC -1,63 0,46 
UniCredit S.p.A. -1,62 0,47 
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa -1,74 0,41 
 
The table shows the results of the univariate ADF test for stationarity. The associated ADF test statistics and p-values are 
presented. The chosen level of significance is 5 %. The null hypothesis is that the series contain a unit root. The null 
hypothesis is rejected if the p-value is less than 0,05. All the banks’ CDS series, except the one for Erste Group Bank AG, 
are non-stationary. 
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C: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Descriptive statistics of changes in the CDS bid-ask spread: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute Crisis Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,00 
 Max. 1,72 0,21 0,21 0,17 1,72 
 Min. -1,77 -0,36 -0,36 -0,13 -1,77 
 Std. Dev. 0,16 0,05 0,05 0,02 0,09 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of CDS 
bid-ask spread changes during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
Descriptive statistics of changes in Total Equity/Total Assets ratio:  
 
 Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute Crisis Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean -0,01 -0,01 0,02 0,00 0,00 
 Max. 1,51 1,24 1,24 3,01 3,01 
 Min. -1,83 -0,75 -0,75 -1,88 -1,88 
 Std. Dev. 0,26 0,18 0,17 0,26 0,24 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of Total 
Equity/Total Assetschanges during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
Descriptive statistics of changes in equity bid-ask spread: 
 
Statistic Pre-Crisis Acute Crisis Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 Max. 0,36 0,06 0,06 0,40 0,40 
 Min. -0,36 -0,07 -0,07 -0,31 -0,36 
 Std. Dev. 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the 
equity bid-ask spread changes during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
Descriptive statistics of changes in equity volatility: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean -0,05 0,38 0,39 -0,13 0,04 
 Max. 4,48 7,96 45,81 47,05 47,05 
 Min. -6,22 -4,73 -5,55 -38,77 -38,77 
 Std. Dev. 0,61 1,08 2,03 2,78 2,06 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the 
equity volatility changes during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
Descriptive statistics of changes in the benchmark government bond yield: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean 0,01 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 
 Max. 0,29 0,39 0,39 0,54 0,54 
 Min. -0,19 -0,32 -0,32 -0,59 -0,59 
 Std. Dev. 0,14 0,17 0,16 0,26 0,20 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the 
benchmark government bond yield changes during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
Descriptive statistics of changes in the interest rate swap: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean 0,03 -0,11 -0,08 -0,03 -0,02 
 Max. 0,35 0,81 0,81 0,47 0,81 
 Min. -0,31 -0,56 -0,56 -0,55 -0,56 
 Std. Dev. 0,17 0,28 0,25 0,19 0,21 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the 
interest rate swap changes during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
Descriptive statistics of changes in market volatility: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean -0,03 1,17 0,08 -0,09 -0,02 
 Max. 10,72 32,14 32,14 22,17 32,14 
 Min. -10,6 -33,84 -33,84 -17,5 -33,84 
 Std. Dev. 3,39 12,74 10,43 6,89 7,22 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of market 
volatility changes during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
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Descriptive statistics of changes in the swap spread:  
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean 0,00 0,05 0,01 0,00 0,00 
 Max. 0,03 1,15 1,15 0,37 1,15 
 Min. -0,03 -0,34 -0,34 -0,21 -0,34 
 Std. Dev. 0,01 0,32 0,26 0,10 0,15 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the swap 
spread changes during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
Descriptive statistics of changes in the slope of the term structure: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean -0,02 0,05 0,04 0,00 0,01 
 Max. 0,06 0,35 0,35 1,91 1,91 
 Min. -0,09 -0,17 -0,17 -1,29 -1,29 
 Std. Dev. 0,04 0,14 0,12 0,42 0,26 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the slope 
of term structure changes during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
Descriptive statistics of credit ratings downgrades: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,06 0,04 
 Max. 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
 Min. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 Std. Dev. 0,06 0,15 0,18 0,25 0,19 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the 
credit ratings downgrades during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
Descriptive statistics of credit rating upgrades: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute Crisis Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 
 Max. 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 
 Min. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 Std. Dev. 0,16 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,10 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the 
credit ratings upgrades during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period. 
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Descriptive statistics of the market return: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean 1,38 -3,99 -1,19 0,65 0,39 
 Max. 5,88 3,68 14,49 10,46 14,49 
 Min. -5,57 -12,35 -12,35 -9,29 -12,35 
 Std. Dev. 2,60 5,53 6,57 4,01 4,63 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the 
market return during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
 
Descriptive statistics of the banks’ stock returns: 
 
Statistic  Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis 
Less  Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
 Mean 1,76 -6,83 -2,21 -0,48 -0,19 
 Max. 29,8 43,56 200,52 208,55 208,55 
 Min. -20,27 -62,29 -70,31 -77,96 -77,96 
 Std. Dev. 5,39 12,24 16,79 16,87 14,10 
 
The table shows the mean, maximum (max.) and minimum (min.) values as well as standard deviation (std. dev.) of the bank 
stock returns during the four sub-periods as well as the whole period.  
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D: Collinearity matrices 
 
Correlation matrix for the pre-crisis period: 
 
 CORR. CBA CEA CEQL CEQV CGLD CIRS CMVL CSWP CTSR DGRD MRET SRET UGRD 
CBA 1,00 0,01 -0,02 -0,05 -0,02 -0,04 0,02 0,08 -0,07 -0,02 0,02 0,07 0,03 
CEA 0,01 1,00 0,00 0,09 -0,02 -0,01 -0,04 0,04 -0,03 -0,04 -0,01 0,02 -0,02 
CEQL -0,02 0,00 1,00 0,03 0,07 0,05 0,04 -0,04 0,06 0,00 -0,02 0,03 0,01 
CEQV -0,05 0,09 0,03 1,00 0,21 0,20 0,05 -0,03 -0,03 0,00 0,10 0,04 -0,02 
CGLD -0,02 -0,02 0,07 0,21 1,00 0,86 0,01 0,07 0,14 0,06 0,16 0,09 -0,01 
CIRS -0,04 -0,01 0,05 0,20 0,86 1,00 0,01 0,12 -0,02 0,07 0,17 0,11 0,01 
CMVL 0,02 -0,04 0,04 0,05 0,01 0,01 1,00 -0,12 0,35 -0,07 0,20 -0,02 -0,05 
CSWP 0,08 0,04 -0,04 -0,03 0,07 0,12 -0,12 1,00 -0,19 -0,07 0,21 0,18 0,02 
CTSR -0,07 -0,03 0,06 -0,03 0,14 -0,02 0,35 -0,19 1,00 -0,03 0,08 -0,08 -0,01 
DGRD -0,02 -0,04 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,07 -0,07 -0,07 -0,03 1,00 -0,06 0,00 0,00 
MRET 0,02 -0,01 -0,02 0,10 0,16 0,17 0,20 0,21 0,08 -0,06 1,00 0,51 -0,02 
SRET 0,07 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,09 0,11 -0,02 0,18 -0,08 0,00 0,51 1,00 0,00 
UGRD 0,03 -0,02 0,01 -0,02 -0,01 0,01 -0,05 0,02 -0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,00 1,00 
 
CBA is the monthly change in the CDS bid-ask spread (in basis points). CDS bid-ask spread is calculated as the bid-ask quotes 
difference divided by the bid-ask midpoint. CEA is the monthly change in Total Equity/Total Assets ratio (percentage points). CEQL 
is the monthly change in equity liquidity proxied by the equity bid-ask spread. Equity bid-ask is computed as the bid-ask difference 
divided by the bid-ask midpoint. CEQV is the change in equity volatility, which is based on the monthly change in the historical 
standard deviation calculated based on a 12-month rolling window of the monthly stock returns of the corresponding entity 
(percentage points). CGLD is the monthly change in the 10-year benchmark government bond yield (percentage points). CIRS is the 
monthly change in the 5-year interest rate swap. CMVL is the monthly change in market volatility, where the VSTOXX index is used 
as a proxy for market volatility. CSWP is the monthly change in the LIBOR-OIS swap spread (percentage points). CTSR is the 
monthly change in the term structure slope (percentage points). DGRD is the credit rating downgrade. MRET is the market return, 
calculated as the return on the STOXX Europe 600 index. SRET is the monthly stock returns of the underlying bank. UGRD is the 
credit rating upgrade. 
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Correlation matrix for the acute phase of the financial crisis: 
 
 CORR. CBA CEA CEQL CEQV CGLD CIRS CMVL CSWP CTSR DGRD MRET SRET 
CBA 1,00 -0,07 -0,06 -0,01 0,05 -0,07 0,23 0,19 0,18 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 
CEA -0,07 1,00 0,01 0,03 0 -0,03 -0,02 0,03 0,02 -0,08 0,01 -0,01 
CEQL -0,06 0,01 1,00 0,09 -0,1 -0,02 -0,13 0,02 -0,11 0,01 -0,04 0,07 
CEQV -0,01 0,03 0,09 1,00 -0,25 -0,2 -0,2 -0,13 -0,08 -0,01 -0,08 -0,08 
CGLD 0,05 0,00 -0,1 -0,25 1,00 0,73 0,13 0,06 -0,09 0,05 0,38 0,18 
CIRS -0,07 -0,03 -0,02 -0,2 0,73 1,00 0,11 0,14 -0,49 0,02 0,31 0,24 
CMVL 0,23 -0,02 -0,13 -0,2 0,13 0,11 1,00 0,45 0,62 0,07 0,12 0,15 
CSWP 0,19 0,03 0,02 -0,13 0,06 0,14 0,45 1,00 0,10 0,01 -0,09 0,16 
CTSR 0,18 0,02 -0,11 -0,08 -0,09 -0,49 0,62 0,10 1,00 0,10 -0,04 -0,05 
DGRD -0,02 -0,08 0,01 -0,01 0,05 0,02 0,07 0,01 0,10 1,00 -0,05 -0,12 
MRET -0,02 0,01 -0,04 -0,08 0,38 0,31 0,12 -0,09 -0,04 -0,05 1,00 0,59 
SRET -0,01 -0,01 0,07 -0,08 0,18 0,24 0,15 0,16 -0,05 -0,12 0,59 1,00 
 
Correlation matrix for the less acute phase of the financial crisis: 
 
 CORR. CBA CEA CEQL CEQV CGLD CIRS CMVL CSWP CTSR DGRD MRET SRET 
CBA 1,00 -0,04 -0,02 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,20 0,14 0,12 0,00 0,06 0,05 
CEA -0,04 1,00 -0,01 0,09 0,00 0,07 -0,06 -0,06 -0,05 -0,04 0,23 0,17 
CEQL -0,02 -0,01 1,00 0,02 -0,05 -0,04 -0,07 0,03 -0,06 0,04 -0,08 -0,08 
CEQV 0,01 0,09 0,02 1,00 -0,05 -0,03 -0,09 -0,10 -0,03 0,01 0,01 0,13 
CGLD 0,05 0,00 -0,05 -0,05 1,00 0,64 0,16 0,02 0,05 0,01 0,27 0,09 
CIRS 0,01 0,07 -0,04 -0,03 0,64 1,00 0,11 0,01 -0,45 0,00 0,45 0,23 
CMVL 0,20 -0,06 -0,07 -0,09 0,16 0,11 1,00 0,44 0,58 0,01 0,02 0,01 
CSWP 0,14 -0,06 0,03 -0,10 0,02 0,01 0,44 1,00 0,16 0,00 -0,25 -0,05 
CTSR 0,12 -0,05 -0,06 -0,03 0,05 -0,45 0,58 0,16 1,00 0,07 -0,20 -0,12 
DGRD 0,00 -0,04 0,04 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,07 1,00 -0,01 -0,04 
MRET 0,06 0,23 -0,08 0,01 0,27 0,45 0,02 -0,25 -0,20 -0,01 1,00 0,56 
SRET 0,05 0,17 -0,08 0,13 0,09 0,23 0,01 -0,05 -0,12 -0,04 0,56 1,00 
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Correlation matrix for the Eurozone crisis period: 
 
 CORR. CBA CEA CEQL CEQV CGLD CIRS CMVL CSWP CTSR DGRD MRET SRET UGRD 
CBA 1,00 0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,03 -0,03 0,10 0,05 0,03 -0,02 0,13 0,08 0,04 
CEA 0,01 1,00 0,00 -0,08 0,01 0,07 0,01 -0,11 0,13 -0,07 0,12 0,12 0,02 
CEQL 0,00 0,00 1,00 -0,24 0,02 -0,03 0,05 0,06 -0,09 -0,03 0,05 0,09 0,02 
CEQV -0,02 -0,08 -0,24 1,00 -0,08 0,03 -0,05 -0,11 0,18 0,00 0,09 0,01 0,04 
CGLD 0,03 0,01 0,02 -0,08 1,00 0,65 -0,10 0,05 -0,07 -0,01 0,05 -0,03 0,03 
CIRS -0,03 0,07 -0,03 0,03 0,65 1,00 -0,36 -0,43 0,10 0,01 0,17 0,08 0,03 
CMVL 0,10 0,01 0,05 -0,05 -0,10 -0,36 1,00 0,33 0,01 -0,10 -0,02 0,07 0,01 
CSWP 0,05 -0,11 0,06 -0,11 0,05 -0,43 0,33 1,00 -0,31 0,01 -0,25 -0,28 0,00 
CTSR 0,03 0,13 -0,09 0,18 -0,07 0,10 0,01 -0,31 1,00 -0,07 0,04 0,13 0,00 
DGRD -0,02 -0,07 -0,03 0,00 -0,01 0,01 -0,10 0,01 -0,07 1,00 -0,23 -0,15 -0,01 
MRET 0,13 0,12 0,05 0,09 0,05 0,17 -0,02 -0,25 0,04 -0,23 1,00 0,45 0,00 
SRET 0,08 0,12 0,09 0,01 -0,03 0,08 0,07 -0,28 0,13 -0,15 0,45 1,00 0,02 
UGRD 0,04 0,02 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,02 1,00 
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E: Pooled model with accounting leverage and the government bond yield 
                                                  
                                                             
          ,             
where we denote         as the change in CDS spread of bank i at time t;    as the intercept; 
       as the change in Total Equity/Total Assets ratio;         as the change in equity 
volatility;         as the change in the benchmark government bond yield;         as the 
credit rating downgrade;         as the credit rating upgrade;        as the change in CDS 
bid-ask spread;         as the change in equity bid-ask spread;         as the change in the 
term structure slope;         as the market return;          as the change in market 
volatility;         as the change in the swap spread. 
 
Table E1. BPG test results 
 
  Pre-Crisis Acute     
Crisis  
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
F-statistic 1,73 3,33 1,76 5,73 5,34 
Prob. 0,06 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,00 
 
The table shows the F-statistics and associated p-values (prob.) obtained in the BPG tests. The null hypothesis of this test 
posits that the errors are homoscedastic. The employed statistical significance level is 5 %. The heteroscedasticity test is run 
for the pooled models in all the sub-periods as well as during the whole sample period. Homoscedastic errors can be 
observed in the pre-crisis as well as the less acute phase of the financial crisis. In the other periods errors are heteroscedastic 
and are corrected using White’s robust standard errors.  
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Table E2. Regression results 
 
  Pre-Crisis Acute  
Crisis 
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
Coefficients         
C 0,06 0,79 2,58** 10,23*** 3,97*** 
  (0,56) (0,49) (2,13) (3,18) (2,65) 
Structural Model  Variables         
∆ Equity/Total Assets -0,25 7,50 -0,31 -49,12* -30,24* 
  (-0,85) (0,75) (-0,04) (-1,78) (-1,90) 
∆ Equity Volatility -0,23 -0,94 -3,55*** -1,48 -1,91 
  (-1,50) (-0,50) (-7,29) (-0,76) (-1,32) 
∆ Government bond yield -0,76 13,07* 7,91 15,21 14,22* 
  (-1.26) (1,80) (1,13) (1,57) (1,86) 
Ratings         
Downgrade -0,95 19,21 17,11*** -38,61** -8,44 
  (-0.47) (1,60) (3,06) (-2,37) (-0,75) 
Upgrade -1,11 NA NA -65,85*** -29,38** 
  (-1,22) NA NA (-4,70) (-2,25) 
Liquidity          
∆ CDS Bid-Ask Spread -1,39*** -164,35*** -194,33*** -464,76*** -35,68*** 
  (-2.99) (-4.22) (-8.30) (-2,97) (-2,89) 
Equity Liquidity         
∆ Equity Bid-Ask Spread 4,10 466,57 335,05* -430,12 -221,32 
  (1,44) (1,33) (1,85) (-0,93) (-0,94) 
Market Factors          
∆ Term Structure Slope 6,59*** 13,51 9,64 -17,76** -25,46*** 
  (2,71) (1,42) (0,83) (-2,22) (-3,47) 
∆ Market Return -0,08*** -1,19*** -1,03*** -8,56*** -3,75*** 
  (-2.60) (-3,86) (-5,56) (-10,17) (-11,01) 
∆ Market Volatility -0,01 -0,06 -0,03 -0,53 -0,10 
  (-0,33) (-0,54) (-0,23) (-1,06) (-0,40) 
∆ Swap Spread -46,11*** 25,96*** 23,45*** 96,92** 29,45*** 
  (-5,91) (4,65) (4,78) (2,51) (3,20) 
         
Adj. R-squared 0,11 0,15 0,22 0,16 0,09 
Nobs. 662 501 850 1361 2873 
 
 
The table presents the coefficient estimates using the pooled regressions. Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. The 
1 % significance level is denoted by ***, the 5 % significance level by ** and respectively the 10 % significance level by *. 
The sample periods are January 2004 to June 2007 (pre-crisis), July 2007 to March 2009 (acute crisis), July 2007 to March 
2010 (less acute crisis), April 2010 to December 2013 (Eurozone crisis), and January 2004 to December 2013 (All). The 
upgrade variable is not included in the regressions for acute and less acute phases as there were no upgrades during these 
sub-periods. Number of observations is denoted by Nobs and it differs in each sub-period as the panel data is unbalanced.  
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F: Pooled model with banks’ stock returns and the government bond yield 
 
                                                   
                                                             
          ,            (2) 
where we denote         as the change in CDS spread of bank i at time t;    as the intercept; 
        as the banks’ stock returns;         as the change in equity volatility;         as the 
change in the benchmark government bond yield;         as the credit rating downgrade; 
        as the credit rating upgrade;        as the change in CDS bid-ask spread;         as 
the change in equity bid-ask spread;         as the change in the term structure slope; 
        as the market return;          as the change in market volatility;         as the 
change in swap spread. 
 
Table F1. BPG test results 
 
  
Pre-Crisis Acute 
Crisis  
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
F-statistic 1,70 12,47 4,68 5,83 5,62 
Prob. 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 
The table shows the F-statistics and associated p-values (prob.) obtained in the BPG tests. The null hypothesis of this test 
posits that the errors are homoscedastic. The employed statistical significance level is 5 %. The heteroscedasticity test is run 
for the pooled models in all the sub-periods as well as during the whole sample period. Homoscedastic errors can be 
observed in the pre-crisis period. In the other periods errors are heteroscedastic and are corrected using White’s robust 
standard errors.  
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Table F2. Regressions results 
 
  Pre-Crisis Acute  
Crisis  
Less Acute 
Crisis 
Eurozone 
Crisis 
All 
Coefficients       
C 0,06 -0,20 2,08* 8,92*** 2,86** 
  (0,54) (-0,12) (1,89) (2,86) (2,02) 
Structural Model  Variables         
Bank Stock Returns -0,01 -0,52 -0,42*** -0,99*** -0,96*** 
  (-0,79) (-1,41) (-2,88) (-3,98) (-5,24) 
∆ Equity Volatility -0,24 -1,15 -3,11*** -1,20 -1,69 
  (-1,61) (-0,60) (-3,59) (-0,57) (-1,09) 
∆ Government bond yield -0,73 10,09 5,13 13,41 11,47 
  (-1,22) (1,35) (0,81) (1,37) (1,49) 
Ratings         
Downgrade -0,84 15,21 15,79** -38,89** -11,02 
  (-0,41) (1,20) (2,54) (-2,44) (-0,99) 
Upgrade -1,09 NA NA -65,80*** -26,31** 
  (-1,20) NA NA (-5,69) (-2,01) 
Liquidity          
∆ CDS Bid-Ask Spread -1,37*** -169,21*** -193,81*** -439,96*** -33,38*** 
  (-2,95) (-4,45) (-5,86) (-2,82) (-2,78) 
Equity Liquidity         
∆ Equity Bid-Ask Spread 4,22 516,14 277,27 -349,89 -185,52 
  (1,48) (1,52) (1,14) (-0,75) (-0,80) 
Market Factors          
∆ Term Structure Slope 6,44*** 10,60 10,15 -19,39** -24,15*** 
  (2,64) (1,03) (1,06) (-2,38) (-3,17) 
∆ Market Return -0,07* -0,47 -0,37 -7,18*** -2,39*** 
  (-1,83) (-1,11) (-1,52) (-8,46) (-6,43) 
∆ Market Volatility -0,01 -0,04 -0,06 -0,23 -0,02 
  (-0,38) (-0,35) (-0,59) (-0,46) (-0,08) 
∆ Swap Spread -46,08*** 30,28*** 27,39*** 68,48* 29,37*** 
  (-5,90) (5,11) (5,02) (1,75) (3,34) 
           
Adj. R-squared 0,11 0,17 0,24 0,16 0,10 
Nobs. 662 501 850 1361 2873 
 
 
The table presents the coefficient estimates using the pooled regression. Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. The   
1 % significance level is denoted by ***, the 5 % significance level by ** and respectively the 10 % significance level by *. 
The sample periods are January 2004 to June 2007 (pre-crisis), July 2007 to March 2009 (acute crisis), July 2007 to March 
2010 (less acute crisis), April 2010 to December 2013 (Eurozone crisis), and January 2004 to December 2013 (All). The 
upgrade variable is not included in the regressions for acute and less acute phases as there were no upgrades during these    
sub-periods. Number of observations is denoted by Nobs and it differs in each sub-period as the panel data is unbalanced. 
